E-Voting Risk Assessment: A Threat Tree for Direct Recording Electronic Systems

E-Voting Risk Assessment: A Threat Tree for Direct Recording Electronic Systems

Harold Pardue (University of South Alabama, USA), Jeffrey P. Landry (University of South Alabama, USA) and Alec Yasinsac (University of South Alabama, USA)
Copyright: © 2011 |Pages: 17
DOI: 10.4018/jisp.2011070102
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Abstract

Approximately 25% (according to http://verifiedvoting.com/) of voting jurisdictions use direct recording electronic systems to record votes. Accurate tabulation of voter intent is critical to safeguard this fundamental act of democracy: voting. Electronic voting systems are known to be vulnerable to attack. Assessing risk to these systems requires a systematic treatment and cataloging of threats, vulnerabilities, technologies, controls, and operational environments. This paper presents a threat tree for direct recording electronic (DRE) voting systems. The threat tree is organized as a hierarchy of threat actions, the goal of which is to exploit a system vulnerability in the context of specific technologies, controls, and operational environment. As an abstraction, the threat tree allows the analyst to reason comparatively about threats. A panel of elections officials, security experts, academics, election law attorneys, representatives from governmental agencies, voting equipment vendors, and voting equipment testing labs vetted the DRE threat tree. The authors submit that the DRE threat tree supports both individual and group risk assessment processes and techniques.
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Introduction

Voting systems function to capture voter intent and anonymously convert that intent into tallied votes. Accuracy and secret ballots are fundamental to democracy. However, ensuring the accuracy of a tally and the anonymity of a voter is extremely difficult in electronic voting systems because the processes occur through a complex interaction of software, hardware, networks, people, policies and legislation (Jones, 2005; Khono, Stubblefield, Rubin, & Wallach, 2004; Weldemariam, 2009; Yasinsac & Bishop, 2008).

The voting system literature is replete with examples of attacks to electronic voting systems (Calindrino et al., 2007; Dill, Mercuri, Neumann, & Wallach, 2008; Epstein, 2007; Feldman, Halderman, & Felten, 2006; Fischer, 2003; Frisina, Herron, Honaker, & Lewis, 2008; Gardner et al., 2007; Hasen, 2000; Hursti, 2006; Kohno, Stubblefield, Rubin, & Wallach, 2004; NIST, 2005; Norden, 2008; Ohio Secretary of State, 2003; Yasinsac et al., 2007).

A pivotal aspect of ensuring integrity of elections conducted on DREs is that, because there is no physical record of each voter’s selections, security is dependent on the DRE software. Software is inherently complex. Theory shows that it is impossible to prove non-trivial properties about arbitrary programs (Rice, 1953) and that at best, testing “… can be a very effective way to show the presence of bugs, but is hopelessly inadequate for showing their absence” (Ditkrtra, 1972).

Was that not bad enough, it is also very difficult even to determine if a computer is executing the intended software (Thompson, 1984). Thus, even if a DRE is properly built, configured, and operated, anyone with private access to the device may be able to install malicious software (i.e., malware) that can alter or control election results.

There are many approaches to securing electronic voting systems: due diligence, compliance, and business enablement (Parker, 2006). Another means of securing voting systems is to conduct a risk assessment. Risk assessment involves assigning a quantitative or qualitative value to the risk of a threat in a specific situation. Assigning a value to the risk of a threat allows the analyst to judiciously allocate relatively scarce resources, conduct sensitivity analysis, perform cost-benefit analyses, and compute residual risk. One approach to conducting risk assessment involves threat trees (Schneier, 1999; Pardue, Landry, & Yasinsac, 2009; Yasinsac & Pardue, 2010).

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