Abstract
To date, our global society is endlessly threatened by disasters. This article devotes to describe both risks and crises on disaster, and especially it deals with the nature of Fukushima case caused by accident of nuclear power plant (aftermath of the disaster at 11th Mar. 2011). Since the human history, this case was one of extreme disasters and multiplied tragedies damaged by quakes, tsunamis, and nuclear power plant accidents. Still now, it presents a number of challenges indeed to be overcome. One of the hardest problems from the inventory of the Fukushima case was characterized as intensive purifications of nuclear pollutions around Fukushima and collective migration of evacuees caused by both natural and human-made disasters. And ongoing disputes against safety seem to vary widely such as compensations, socioeconomic reasons, environmental restorations, and community reconstructions. The author intends to review these issues and discuss future design for the lessons from the disaster.
TopBackground
No blindness against the truth shall conceal the nature of the serious tragedies around the Fukushima. It should conquer an innermost meaning of sentence “Ignoramus et ignorabimus” (We do not know and will not know). Those who independently inquired into the matters ever since the crisis condemned collective optimism and anti-scientism among governmental authorities and polytechnics (Funabashi,Y&Kitazawa,K, 2012). They were hoping to stop more catastrophes, but they clung to saving their faces and dogmatic standpoints. Their statements against risks of nuclear power discredited any citizens. Consequently their poor management of risk prevention in nuclear energy following the tsunamis and nuclear power plant accidents magnified the damage. Their less attention has given to scientific verification ways (Cyranoski,D, 2011). Through entirely investigations on consequences after the disaster, Japanese obtained the lessons: no social systems exist without any scientific verification, and no solutions will be properly conducted without the efforts by true professionalism (academician, governors and other practitioners) involving civic engagements.
In this point, the SCJ’s report pointed out crucially lack of effective risk management for nuclear power plant accidents before the crisis (Science Council of Japan, 2011). Regarding this, in sociology of science, Merton,R.K (1968) already proposed his conceptual term ’CUDOS’, namely Communality, Universality, Disinterestedness and Organized Skepticism. Not to mention, scientific community in Japan should be recalled the significance of both Disinterestedness and Organized Skepticism in his prospective discussions. The rule of conduct among scientists as well as anti-crisis operations and imperatives by governors need to be critically reviewed whether national crisis or not. Eventually scientists must be always devoting to strictly scientific governance in their community. Obviously, the social roles shall be undertaken by professional academicians and researchers in terms of their majors standing on the CUDOS. It is too natural that they shall be obligated to solve above emerged and serious matters. Similarly JST (2011) proposed to solve and tackle those scientific matters by both social and natural scientists. For example, they enumerated modeling and simulation for disaster prevention, risk management, and risk communication for citizens as well as R&D on the nuclear power and new energy technologies (Sugiyama, et al, 2016).
Key Terms in this Chapter
Coase Theorem: Coase theorized economic balance between efficiency and outcome caused by externalities among stakeholders in economics ( Coase, 1960 ), and it defines to fulfill three conditions such as (1) low negotiation costs, (2) clarity of attribution of rights, and (3) endorsement for completeness of information.
Migration and Evacuation in Disaster: Aftermath of the serious disasters, it should be shed light on migration and demographic dynamics of evacuees. Certainly, it should distinguish between forced migration and spontaneous one ( Castles, 2003 ; Jacobse & Landau, 2003 ). Formally, the former can be considered that governors and officers in charge can enact necessary legal imperatives for citizens, and the latter can be based on the will of each citizen. However, human-made disaster usually generates inevitable matters against unneglectable risks, and then every stakeholder directly faces the evacuation problems.
Kaldor-Hicks Criterion: This criterion refers to discussions on compensation principle in welfare economics ( Hicks, 1939 ; Kaldor, 1939 ), and it also widely applied in policy studies and environmental studies. It characterizes the form of cost–benefit analysis. In the cost–benefit analysis, each policy is deliberated and evaluated by comparing the total costs (e.g., building costs and environmental costs) with the total benefits (e.g., profits and convenience for stakeholders).