Mechanisms to Restrict Exploitation and Improve Societal Performance in Multi-Agent Systems

Mechanisms to Restrict Exploitation and Improve Societal Performance in Multi-Agent Systems

Sharmila Savarimuthu (University of Otago, New Zealand), Martin Purvis (University of Otago, New Zealand), Maryam Purvis (University of Otago, New Zealand) and Mariusz Nowostawski (University of Otago, New Zealand)
Copyright: © 2009 |Pages: 13
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-59904-576-4.ch011
OnDemand PDF Download:
$37.50

Abstract

Societies are made of different kinds of agents, some cooperative and uncooperative. Uncooperative agents tend to reduce the overall performance of the society, due to exploitation practices. In the real world, it is not possible to decimate all the uncooperative agents; thus the objective of this research is to design and implement mechanisms that will improve the overall benefit of the society without excluding uncooperative agents. The mechanisms that we have designed include referrals and resource restrictions. A referral scheme is used to identify and distinguish noncooperators and cooperators. Resource restriction mechanisms are used to restrict noncooperators from selfish resource utilization. Experimental results are presented describing how these mechanisms operate.
Chapter Preview
Top

Cooperative Behaviour In Multi-Agent Society

For a society to operate effectively, agents within the society must obey certain social rules and norms. So far, much of the focus in this area has been on work devoted to the identification of malevolent agents, where the goal is to identify a noncooperator and exclude it from the society. However, in the real world, it is not going to be applicable in all situations. Our focus is on situations where society members are behaving in an uncooperative manner, but are not necessarily “evil” and deserving of expulsion. This is the issue of the “Tragedy of the Commons” (Hardin, 1968).

Tragedy of the Commons

In Hardin’s classic paper (Hardin, 1968), “Tragedy of the Commons,” he outlines the “tragedy.” A common pasture is open to herders, each of which tries to maintain as many cattle as possible on the commons. A herder will reckon that the positive benefits of adding one additional animal will all go to him, alone, whereas the negative effects from overgrazing of that one additional animal will be shared borne by all the herders. Accordingly, self-interested herders may continue adding one more animal to their herds, even if they know that collectively this is destroying the commons. The question is: how are restrict selfish herders to avoid the tragedy?

The Tragedy of the Commons can be related to the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” situation (Axelrod, 1984). Two collaborating criminals are imprisoned and questioned separately. Each criminal may cooperate with his fellow criminal by refusing to divulge details of the crime or defect by ratting on his colleague. It is possible to establish a reward structure (see Figure 1) such that:

  • If both criminals cooperate they get a reward, R,

  • If they both defect, they are punished (punishment, P),

  • If one player defects and the other cooperates, then the defector gets high reward (temptation, T) and the other gets a severe punishment (sucker, S)

  • And T > R > P > S, and 2R > T + S

Under these reward conditions, each individual criminal will reason that if the other

  • Cooperates, he does better by defecting, and if the other

  • Defects, he also does better by defecting.

    Figure 1.

    Payoff matrix for prisoner’s dilemma

Thus, the Nash equilibrium situation for this game is for both players to defect, even though they would collectively get a higher reward if they were both to cooperate. The Tragedy of the Commons can be likened to a situation in which the individual herder is playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma game against the collection of all the other herders: his selfish interests lead him to defect, even though they are all better off if they cooperate.

Another cooperation game that is discussed in the literature is the Stag Hunt game. The metaphor here is two hunters who may cooperate to hunt a stag (high reward, S). If they operate by themselves, they each can only catch a rabbit (lower reward, R). A hunter seeking to hunt a stag without cooperation gets nothing. But there is no sucker’s reward here. The reward structure is shown below (see Figure 2).

Figure 2.

Payoff matrix for Stag Hunt

Complete Chapter List

Search this Book:
Reset
Table of Contents
Preface
Dariusz Król, Ngoc Thanh Nguyen
Chapter 1
Juliusz L. Kulikowski
In this chapter, a concept of using incomplete or fuzzy ontologies in decision making is presented. A definition of ontology and of ontological... Sample PDF
Logical Inference Based on Incomplete and/or Fuzzy Ontologies
$37.50
Chapter 2
Amelia Badica, Costin Badica, Elvira Popescu
The Web is designed as a major information provider for the human consumer. However, information published on the Web is difficult to understand and... Sample PDF
Using Logic Programming and XML Technologies for Data Extraction from Web Pages
$37.50
Chapter 3
Andreas Jacobsson, Paul Davidsson
This chapter introduces a formal model of virtual enterprises, as well as an analysis of their creation and operation. It is argued that virtual... Sample PDF
A Formal Analysis of Virtual Enterprise Creation and Operation
$37.50
Chapter 4
Donat Orski
The chapter concerns a class of systems composed of operations performed with the use of resources allocated to them. In such operation systems... Sample PDF
Application of Uncertain Variables to Knowledge-Based Resource Distribution
$37.50
Chapter 5
Clive Fencott
This chapter undertakes a methodological study of virtual environments (VEs), a specific subset of interactive systems. It takes as a central theme... Sample PDF
A Methodology of Design for Virtual Environments
$37.50
Chapter 6
Salvador Sanchez-Alonso, Dirk Frosch-Wilke
In current organizations, the models of knowledge creation include specific processes and elements that drive the production of knowledge aimed at... Sample PDF
An Ontological Representation of Competencies as Codified Knowledge
$37.50
Chapter 7
Marcos De Oliveira, Martin Purvis
In the distributed multi-agent systems discussed in this chapter, heterogeneous autonomous agents interoperate in order to achieve their goals. In... Sample PDF
Aspects of Openness in Multi-Agent Systems: Coordinating the Autonomy in Agent Societies
$37.50
Chapter 8
Kostas Kolomvatsos, Stathes Hadjiefthymiades
The field of Multi-agent systems (MAS) has been an active area for many years due to the importance that agents have to many disciplines of research... Sample PDF
How Can We Trust Agents in Multi-Agent Environments? Techniques and Challenges
$37.50
Chapter 9
Mariusz Nowostawski
The concept of autonomy is one of the central concepts in distributed computational systems, and in multi-agent systems in particular. With diverse... Sample PDF
The Concept of Autonomy in Distributed Computation and Multi-Agent Systems
$37.50
Chapter 10
Maryam Purvis, Toktam Ebadi, Bastin Tony Roy Savarimuthu
The objective of this research is to describe a mechanism to provide an improved library management system using RFID and agent technologies. One of... Sample PDF
An Agent-Based Library Management System Using RFID Technology
$37.50
Chapter 11
Sharmila Savarimuthu, Martin Purvis, Maryam Purvis, Mariusz Nowostawski
Societies are made of different kinds of agents, some cooperative and uncooperative. Uncooperative agents tend to reduce the overall performance of... Sample PDF
Mechanisms to Restrict Exploitation and Improve Societal Performance in Multi-Agent Systems
$37.50
Chapter 12
Bastin Tony Roy Savarimuthu, Maryam Purvis, Stephen Cranefield
Norms are shared expectations of behaviours that exist in human societies. Norms help societies by increasing the predictability of individual... Sample PDF
Norm Emergence in Multi-Agent Societies
$37.50
Chapter 13
Scott A. DeLoach, Madhukar Kumar
This chapter provides an overview of the Multi-agent Systems Engineering (MaSE) methodology for analyzing and designing multi-agent systems. MaSE... Sample PDF
Multi-Agent Systems Engineering: An Overview and Case Study
$37.50
Chapter 14
František Capkovic
An alternative approach to modeling and analysis of agents’ behaviour is presented in this chapter. The agents and agent systems are understood here... Sample PDF
Modeling, Analysing, and Control of Agents Behaviour
$37.50
Chapter 15
Martin Tabakov
This chapter presents a methodology for an image enhancement process of computed tomography perfusion images by means of partition generated with... Sample PDF
Using Fuzzy Segmentation for Colour Image Enhancement of Computed Tomography Perfusion Images
$37.50
Chapter 16
Giovanni Vincenti, Goran Trajkovski
This chapter presents an innovative approach to the field of information fusion. Fuzzy mediation differentiates itself from other algorithms, as... Sample PDF
Fuzzy Mediation in Shared Control and Online Learning
$37.50
Chapter 17
Adam Jatowt, Yukiko Kawai, Katsumi Tanaka
The Web is a useful data source for knowledge extraction, as it provides diverse content virtually on any possible topic. Hence, a lot of research... Sample PDF
Utilizing Past Web for Knowledge Discovery
$37.50
Chapter 18
Dariusz Król
In this chapter, we propose a generic framework in C# to distribute and compute tasks defined by users. Unlike the more popular models such as... Sample PDF
Example-Based Framework for Propagation of Tasks in Distributed Environments
$37.50
Chapter 19
Xia Xie, Jin Huang, Song Wu, Hai Jin, Melvin Koh, Jie Song, Simon See
In this chapter, we present a survey on some of the commercial players in the Grid industry, existing research done in the area of market-based Grid... Sample PDF
Survey on the Application of Economic and Market Theory for Grid Computing
$37.50
About the Contributors