Chapter 1.30
Malicious Software

Thomas M. Chen
Southern Methodist University, USA

Gregg W. Tally
SPARTA, Inc., USA

INTRODUCTION

Malicious software (malware) allows an intruder to take over or damage a target host without the owner’s consent and often without his or her knowledge. Over the past thirty years, malware has become a more serious worldwide problem as Internet-connected computers have proliferated and operating systems have become more complex. Today, the average PC user must be more cognizant of computer security than ever before due to the constant threat of possible infection. Although exact costs are difficult to determine, there is little doubt that malware has widespread impact on equipment damages, loss of data, and loss of productivity. According to surveys, malware is one of the most common and costly types of attack on organizations (CERT, CSO, & ECTF, 2005).

In the early days of computing, malware was predominantly viruses and Trojan horses that spread among computers mainly by floppy disks and shared files (Grimes, 2001). The typical virus writer was a young male experimenting by himself and looking for notoriety. Today, malware is largely worms, viruses, spyware, bots, and Trojans proliferating through computer networks. Worms are a particular concern due to their ability to spread by themselves through computer networks. They can exploit weaknesses in operating systems or common applications such as Web and e-mail clients. They are often used as vehicles to install other types of malware onto hosts. Many thousands of worms and viruses are constantly tracked by the WildList (Wildlist Organization International, 2006) and antivirus companies.

Naturally, host-based and network-based defenses have also evolved in sophistication in response to growing threats. Surveys have found that organizations almost universally use antivirus software, firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and other means of protection (Gordon, Loeb, Lucyshyn, & Richardson, 2005). These defenses certainly block a tremendous amount of malware and prevent global disasters. However, their effectiveness is widely known to be limited...
by their ability to accurately detect malware. Detection accuracy is critical because malware must be blocked without interfering with legitimate computer activities or network traffic. This difficulty is compounded by the creativity of attackers continually attempting to invent new methods to avoid detection.

**BACKGROUND**

**Self-Replicating Malware**

Malware can be classified into self-replicating or nonself-replicating. Self-replicating malware consists of viruses and worms. Fred Cohen originated the term virus after biological viruses for their manner of parasitically injecting their RNA into a normal cell, which then hijack the cell’s reproductive process to produce copies of the virus (Cohen, 1994). Analogously, computer viruses attach their code to a normal program or file, which takes over control of execution of the infected program to copy the virus code to another program.

Polymorphism was a major development in virus evolution around 1990. Polymorphic viruses are able to scramble their form to have at most a few bytes in common between copies to avoid detection by virus scanners. In 1991, the dark avenger’s mutation engine was an easy to use program for adding polymorphism to any virus. A number of other “mutation engines” were subsequently created by other virus writers.

A new wave of mass-mailing viruses began with Melissa in 1999. It was a macro virus infecting Microsoft Word normal templates. On infected computers, it launched Microsoft Outlook and e-mailed copies of itself to 50 recipients in the address book. It demonstrated the effectiveness of e-mail as a propagation vector, infecting 100,000 computers in 3 days. Since then, e-mail has continued to be a popular vector for viruses and worms because e-mail is used by everyone across different operating systems (Harley, Slade, & Gattiker, 2001). Mass-mailing worms today often carry their own SMTP engines to mail themselves and circumvent security features in e-mail programs.

Whereas viruses are program fragments dependent on execution of a host program, worms are standalone programs capable of spreading by themselves (Nazario, 2004; Skoudis, 2004). A worm searches for potential targets through a computer network and sends a copy of itself if the target is successfully compromised. Worms take advantage of networks and have proliferated as Internet connectivity has become ubiquitous.

One of the earliest and most famous worms was written by Robert Morris Jr. in 1988. Perhaps released accidentally, it disabled 6,000 hosts, which was 10% of the ARPANET (the predecessor to the Internet). A number of fast worms, notably Code Red I, Code Red II, and Nimda appeared in 2001. Two years later, another wave of fast worms included SQL Slammer/Sapphire, Blaster, and Sobig.F. The following year was dominated by MyDoom, Netsky, and Bagle worms (Turner et al., 2006).

Nonself-replicating malware classification of nonself-replicating malware into disjoint subcategories is difficult because many types of nonself-replicating malware share similar characteristics. Perhaps the largest category is Trojan horses defined as programs with hidden malicious functions. A Trojan horse may be disguised as a legitimate program to avoid detection. For example, a Trojan horse could be installed on a host with the name of a legitimate system file (displacing that file). Alternatively, the intention of the disguise could be to deceive users into executing it. For example, a Trojan horse could appear to be a graphic attachment in an e-mail message but in actuality be a malicious program. Trojans do not replicate by themselves but could spread by file sharing or downloading.

Remote administration or access trojans (RATs) are a well-known type of trojan horse
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