The basic matter for the economic literature on standards competition (often referred to as “standards wars”) is to investigate whether or not the market settles on efficient standards – and further: whether or not public policy intervention is justified from a social welfare point-of-view (David & Greenstein, 1990; Stango, 2004). Important contributions are descriptions of how standards choice is dependent on prior historical events (Arthur, 1989) and how historical events can lead to the market locking in on (supposedly) inferior standards (David, 1985). Other important contributions are describing the effects of “the existing installed base” of users having adopted a standard (Farrell & Saloner, 1986), and how direct and indirect network effects (existing adopters’ added utility of having a new user adopting a standard) influence competition outcomes (Katz & Shapiro, 1994). Particularly for “interface compatibility standards” (whose received definition is not unproblematic and is therefore discussed in the next section) is that it is generally recognised that uniform uptake (meaning a resolved standards war) of a single standard leads to economies of scale and interoperability of products, whereas fragmented uptake (meaning an unresolved standards war) of non-compatible standards negatively impacts these issues (Grindley, 1995).