A Conceptual Model for Integrative Monitoring of Nuclear Power Plants Operational Activities Based on Historical Nuclear Incidents and Accidents

Current Methods

Currently, utilizers of nuclear technology use Correction Action Management Programs (CAMPs) to monitor the safety and reliability of the given processes that they employ. Typically, CAMPs rely on a software suite. The individual applications employed within this software suite monitor the core functions of the nuclear system (Hashemian, 2011). These applications employ an initialization phase and an evolution phase to provide customized monitoring and safety protection. The application’s initialization phase is determined based on user request, and the information volume currently available to the software vendor. The application’s evolution phase is continual through its life cycle and can be derived from administrator inputs or daily network data feeds.

The initialization phase of a nuclear system’s safety and monitoring management plan is typically dependent on operational experience (IAEA, 2005). This operational experience is composed of industry experiences, good practices, self-assessment, and internal events of the operational system (IAEA, 2005). Due to the uniqueness of each system’s external and internal influences, the operational experience of each nuclear system is unique unto itself (IAEA, 2005). And this type of system-dependent experience is beneficial to the focused monitoring of system specific processes. But in order to encompass total nuclear system safety and monitoring protection, the system must have the capability of awareness to non-specific and unexpected events.