Incentives and Knowledge Mismatch

Incentives and Knowledge Mismatch

Parthasarathi Banerjee (National Institute of Science, Technology & Development (NISTADS), India)
Copyright: © 2002 |Pages: 19
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-93070-840-2.ch021
OnDemand PDF Download:
$37.50

Abstract

A large public bank B in an economy now under transition to liberalization, attempted reengineering its structure and business processes. B has a large branch-based structure to acquire local savings where banking processes add little value. Value is added at the head office through bankbased financial operations and through providing credit to industry. Appreciating that competition was sharpening; two successive chairmen and a few senior managers initiated change management. However, they could not choosefrom out of structure, business process, strategy and technology what was the driver of change and in what sequence of change would be the best outcome! A consultant was appointed. However, negotiations on change management between the stakeholders and the consultant resulted in tacit opportunistic alliance. An apparently loaded report on change resulted in minor changes. BPR failed because processes remained unrecognized and technology instead of hastening change turned out to be a new instrument of monitoring.

Complete Article List

Search this Journal:
Reset
Open Access Articles: Forthcoming
Volume 19: 4 Issues (2017)
Volume 18: 4 Issues (2016)
Volume 17: 4 Issues (2015)
Volume 16: 4 Issues (2014)
Volume 15: 4 Issues (2013)
Volume 14: 4 Issues (2012)
Volume 13: 4 Issues (2011)
Volume 12: 4 Issues (2010)
Volume 11: 4 Issues (2009)
Volume 10: 4 Issues (2008)
Volume 9: 4 Issues (2007)
Volume 8: 4 Issues (2006)
Volume 7: 4 Issues (2005)
Volume 6: 1 Issue (2004)
Volume 5: 1 Issue (2003)
Volume 4: 1 Issue (2002)
Volume 3: 1 Issue (2001)
Volume 2: 1 Issue (2000)
Volume 1: 1 Issue (1999)
View Complete Journal Contents Listing