Certificate-Based PKC Scheme in VANETs
Numerous studies and standards cite the use of a certificate-based PKC to support security for VANETs (Di Crescenzo et al., 2007; Freudiger et al., 2007, 2008; Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 2006; Iyer et al., 2008; Kounga et al., 2009; Papadimitratos et al., 2007; Plößl & Federrath, 2008; Plößl et al., 2006; Rao et al., 2007; Raya & Hubaux, 2005a, 2005b, 2007; Raya et al., 2006; Sunnadkal et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2008; Xiaonan et al., 2007). For example, Raya and Hubaux (2005a) appear to be the first research team to propose a vehicular Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), based on a certificate-based PKC scheme to support security services for message exchange in the vehicular communication environment. IEEE 1609.2-2006 Standard for Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE) (2006) mandates the use of certificate-based PKC mechanisms to support authentication and encryption services for VANETs. Papadimitratos et al. (2007) discuss a security architecture based on the certificate-based PKC mechanism for VANETs. However, only a few authors have acknowledged the shortcomings of using the certificate-based PKC scheme in VANETs (Plößl & Federrath, 2008; Raya & Hubaux, 2007). Secure messaging based on the certificate-based PKC scheme has a number of limitations, including complexity in certificate verification and management, scalability, performance in a large-scale environment, and timely access to certificate revocation information. These issues with the certificate-based PKC scheme remain when applied to VANETs.