Despite this recent momentum on wicked problems, C.W. Churchman’s original concern on the moral challenges of the wicked problem remains under-examined (Wexler, 2009). Churchman claimed that wicked problems entail moral responsibilities very different from one formulating and solving a routine or ‘tame’ problem (Wexler, 2009). Specifically then, what does this mean for planners and therefore, what are the ethical dimensions of wicked problems in planning?2 And what should be the ethical theories relevant for planning in the age of wicked problems? Ethics, which is concerned with what is morally good, what is right and what a planner is obliged to do, is often obscured by the complex processes behind urban and regional planning decisions (Kirkman, 2010)—and this is even before one imputes wicked problems into planning. And although Rittel alluded to the ethical dimensions of wicked problems in different writings, and ethics was close to his research and teaching (Protzen & Harris, 2010), Rittel did not consolidate his thinking on the ethical dimensions of wicked problems in planning. Nonetheless, answers to these questions are important because the nature of the planners’ ethical obligations will depend in part on the ethical theories used to understand and guide planning today.