Proof for Evolution and Coming Out of Prison with Relational Dynamics

Proof for Evolution and Coming Out of Prison with Relational Dynamics

David S. Bathory (Psychology Department, Bathory International, LLC., Somerville, NJ, USA)
Copyright: © 2015 |Pages: 12
DOI: 10.4018/ijabe.2015010104
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Abstract

Within theories of mathematical prediction, decision and behavior such as game theory, there is the assumption that the players wish to win. The prisoner's dilemma points to the virtues of defection, or immediate self-preservation. Within the theory of evolutionary biology (Wilson & Wilson, 2007), motives are described from both the benefit of an individual and that of a larger group or collective, such as a colony, herd, pack or pod. Darwin described competition with his theory of survival of the fittest (Darwin, 1859 (reprinted 1982)); the theory of the selfish gene provides the motive of ensuring the transmission of similar genetics onto the next generation. (Dawkins, 1989) Nowak and Coakley (2013) explore the advantages of cooperation within evolution. Within psychological theory there is a preponderance of theory and clinical evidence that outlines other motivations such as Freud's death wish; sociopathic behaviors; philanthropists and altruism; racial/ethnic hatred, bullying and retaliation. Examples of strategies found in nature, the strategies for mutual benefit, best for me, best for you, and the best for neither are explored. A proof for evolution is provided outlining the rationale for cooperation. Cooperation; the sole outcome where there is long term gain and benefit for all versus other strategies such as competition and selfishness found in living organisms that ultimately results in extinction.
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2. The Game Of Evolutionary Biology: From The Fittest To The Selfish And Onto Cooperation

Darwin studied species of animals in an attempt to understand how genetics played a part in the creation of differences. He noted selection of the fittest as a basis of how one species or individual was “more successful” in surviving than another. In looking at survival of a species, the concept of the selfish gene has arisen in Evolutionary Biology to explain why one individual or species risks its’ own survival to continue the chances of the rest of its’ family’s (colony, herd, pack or pod) survival. The selfish gene is to increase the chances of a specific genetic code being transmitted to the next generation, to insure “my” genes or those as close to my own continue (Dawkins, 1989). A cooperative gene has been proposed in contrast to selfishness. Here the cooperative gene has the motive to increase the likelihood of its survival and that of those like it and also other species who are not overly aggressive towards it, to promote continuance and growth into future generations. Individuals and species that cooperate create a symbiotic relationship. (Nowak M., 2011) This symbiosis can be found through-out nature; from viruses that modify their RNA to enter mammals’ cells and then provide immunity only to later recombinant to survive into future generations to pods of dolphins who befriend sharks to ward off a killer whale attack. Within humans, we raise domestic cattle for food, but ensure that we do not consume the entire herd, and go to great lengths to avoid inbreeding, so that their genetic pools stay healthy and strong. Within economics, the businesses that thrive are those who do not eliminate their competitors, but find ways to either mutually benefit (specialize in different products) or partner to provide something together. Aggressive behavior may end in short term wins but ends losing in the long term battle and creates mistrust, hatred, and continued aggression. (Darwin, 1859 (reprinted 1982)) (Churchland, 2011) (Nowak M. A., 2013a). Hauert (2013) postulates a mathematical equation for stability as: r=c/(2b-c) to account for determining altruistic and selfish acts.

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