Template Protection and Renewability for Dynamic Time Warping Based Biometric Signature Verification

Template Protection and Renewability for Dynamic Time Warping Based Biometric Signature Verification

Emanuele Maiorana (Università degli Studi Roma TRE, Italy), Patrizio Campisi (Università degli Studi Roma TRE, Italy) and Alessandro Neri (Università degli Studi Roma TRE, Italy)
Copyright: © 2009 |Pages: 18
DOI: 10.4018/jdcf.2009062404

Abstract

In this article, the authors propose a protected on-line signature based biometric authentication system, where the original signature templates are protected by transforming them in a non-invertible way. Recovering the original biometrics from the stored data is thus computationally as hard as random guessing them. The transformed templates are compared employing a Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) matching strategy. The reported experimental results, evaluated on the public MCYT signature database, show that the achievable recognition rates are only slightly affected by the proposed protection scheme, which is able to guarantee the desired security and renewability for the considered biometrics.
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Biometric Template Security

The unauthorized copy of the stored biometric data is probably the most dangerous threat regarding users' privacy and security. Therefore, many solutions have been investigated in the recent past to secure biometric templates. Among them, the most promising approaches consist in the implementation of cancelable biometrics [RCB01]. This expression is commonly referred to the application of intentional non-invertible and repeatable modifications to the original biometric templates. Specifically, a properly defined cancelable biometrics should satisfy the following requirements:

  • Security: it should be impossible or computationally unfeasible to obtain the original biometric template from the transformed one;

  • Revocability: it should be possible to revoke a compromised template and issue a new one based on the same biometric data;

  • Diversity: each template generated from a biometrics should not match with others previously generated from the same data;

  • Performance: the recognition performance of the protected system, in terms of False Rejection Rate (FRR) or False Acceptance Rate (FAR), should not degrade significantly with respect to an unprotected system.

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