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Since 2001 the US and other coalition countries have gradually increased the amount of resources they employ in fighting the war in Afghanistan (Belasco, 2008). On average, the U.S. government alone was spending roughly $2.4 billion per month on the war in Afghanistan through the end of fiscal year 2008 and has spent a total of $15.6 billion on Afghan security forces alone over the course of the conflict (Belasco, 2008). Since 2008, this number has been increasing. Considering the employment rate in the United States and the growing governmental debt, there is an increasing pressure in Washington to ensure that national resources are allocated as efficiently as possible.
Despite an increase in the allocation of resources, many studies indicate stability is getting worse in the country and that the coalition is losing the war (Akhtar, 2008; Hrychuk, 2007; Johnson & Mason, 2007; Katzman, 2008; The White House, 2009). There has been a steady increase in violence in Afghanistan since 2005 in terms of incidents and the number of coalition soldiers killed and wounded (Aras & Toktas, 2008). In addition, the insurgency has continued to increase gradually since 2003 and insurgent attacks have intensified and become more sophisticated in terms of technology and tactics (Aras & Toktas, 2008; Reuter & Younus, 2009; Ruttig, 2009). In addition, many sources indicate that by 2007 30% of Afghanistan was under Taliban control, and some estimates placed this figure as high as 54% (Loyn, 2009). Based on these facts there is significant evidence that supports the argument that the Afghan government is losing the population’s support (Aras & Toktas, 2008).