Against Method, Against Science?: On Logic, Order, and Analogy in the Sciences

Background (And Literature Review)

Much has been written about Against Method but there has been relatively little research first on the use of analogy in the book and second, on the extent to which these analogies are convincing. This chapter will focus on both areas. “Analogy” will be understood conventionally, in a logical sense, as a likeness or a similarity between two or more things. “Science” will be understood conventionally also in the sense of a discipline that seeks to produce hypotheses which when tested empirically lead to theories, which in turn produce effective explanations of phenomena and allow us to make successful predictions, which in turn can be tested empirically also. It is acknowledged that there are other possible definitions of science, for example, Kuhn’s emphasis on the production of paradigms or Popper’s emphasis on methods of falsification (see for example Kuhn 2000, 1977, 1962 and 1957, among others, and Popper, 1959, 1963, 1966, 1972, 1982, 1983, 1987, 1992 and 1994B, among many others, for discussions of falsification, realism, objective knowledge and rationality in the sciences).