Challenges in Sharing Computer and Network Logs

Challenges in Sharing Computer and Network Logs

Adam Slagell (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA) and Kiran Lakkaraju (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA)
Copyright: © 2010 |Pages: 17
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-60566-414-9.ch004
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Abstract

It is desirable for many reasons to share information, particularly computer and network logs. Researchers need it for experiments, incident responders need it for collaborative security, and educators need this data for real world examples. However, the sensitive nature of this information often prevents its sharing. Anonymization techniques have been developed in recent years that help reduce risk and navigate the trade-offs between privacy, security and the need to openly share information. This chapter looks at the progress made in this area of research over the past several years, identifies the major problems left to solve and sets a roadmap for future research.
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Introduction

On March 20, 2004, the security incident response team at the National Center for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA) at the University of Illinois received an automated alert indicating that a particular NCSA machine was making an atypical number of outbound connections to external hosts. Often, when something like this happened in the past, it was because a machine had been infected with a worm or become part of a botnet. Naturally, the team investigated the anomaly, and they found that unauthorized ports were open. By scanning the machine and reviewing their network flows, they found that the host was running a backdoor SSH client granting remote access to an unauthorized user. Worse yet, a subsequent scan of the network revealed that other machines had the same strange port open and were also compromised. Little did they realize that this was only the very smallest tip of the iceberg.

Rather quickly, it was discovered that the attacker, who later started identifying himself as “Stakkato,” spread his attacks across much more than the NCSA network. He exploited a number of specific vulnerabilities across many of the TeraGrid sites. The TeraGrid was at the time the world’s largest, most comprehensive distributed computing infrastructure for open scientific research, with high-performance computing resources spread across 11 institutions. While the attacks were expanding to encompass more and more institutions, they were also escalating in frequency. Because the attacker installed Trojaned SSH daemons on many infected machines, he was able to compromise accounts faster than they could be closed or have their passwords changed. This problem was exacerbated by the fact that many of the TeraGrid resources shared authentication credentials, as a typical user could run jobs on any of the TeraGrid supercomputers. Some of the sites were at times just trying to keep their heads above water to stay on top of this problem; eventually, all users were forced to change their passwords at these sites.

As the scope of the problem grew, even beyond TeraGrid, the FBI was brought in on the matter. A few key institutions became the points of contact between the FBI and the many other institutions involved with the case (which was named Major Case 216 by the FBI). Before the investigation was finally complete, the attacks had spanned 19 months and thousands of sites, including high-security military sites and federal research laboratories, university sites, private sector sites, and machines owned by individuals, both in the U.S. and in Europe. It was finally tracked back to a teenager in Sweden after whose apprehension the attacks suddenly stopped (Nixon, 2006).

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