Cyber Risks in Energy Grid ICT Infrastructures

Cyber Risks in Energy Grid ICT Infrastructures

Giovanna Dondossola (RSE S.p.A., Italy), Fabrizio Garrone (RSE S.p.A., Italy) and Judit Szanto (RSE S.p.A., Italy)
Copyright: © 2014 |Pages: 22
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-5942-1.ch015
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Abstract

The objective of the chapter is to present the role of cyber security experiments within a methodological approach for the evaluation of cyber risks in grid control systems. As a starting point, a cyber-power risk index has been defined to support the identification of relevant risk factors across network attack models. Instances of attack models have been then experimented on an ICT architecture implementing grid operation scenarios with the double aim of evaluating the attacks' effects by means of communication performance measures and of tuning the configuration of security mechanisms. The chapter discusses the results of a variety of attack experiments and their role in the calculation of the risk index.
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Background

The experimental evaluation of cyber attacks targeting grid control systems is of fundamental value for research related to the protection of critical information infrastructures, specifically in the ICT-energy cross sectors. The key issues about dependencies in critical infrastructures were addressed the first time in the United States by (Rinaldi, 2004), where a dependency is defined as a connection between two infrastructures, through which the state of one infrastructure influences or is correlated to the state of the other.

Since 2004 the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology started to publish an inventory of national and international infrastructure protection policies updated on a bi-annual basis (Wenger, 2008). At governmental level the Department of Energy stipulated a huge research program specific to a National SCADA Test Bed for the energy sector (DoE, 2008).

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