This chapter offers to illuminate some of the complex relations between conscious, rational, higher order human functions and unconscious and intuitive processes, especially in the context of teaching and learning of higher order thinking. The chapter will consider dialogical models, especially those of Richard Paul and Mikhail Bakhtin, for teaching and learning of higher order thinking, which take into account these complex relations, and aims at optimizing higher order thinking skills and dispositions, without neglecting human's emotional side and their need for authentic self-expression.
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The social intuitionist theory (Haidt, 2001, 2006, 2007) asserts that “moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached [and that] the model is an intuitionist model in that it states that moral judgment is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations” (Haidt, 2001, p. 814). While the theory’s main concern is with moral judgments, it is possible to extrapolate its claim to the entire sphere of human cognition, judgment, and decision-making. Indeed, as Haidt (2001, see also, Greene, et al., 2001) himself notices, the social intuitionist theory overlaps with the dual-process theory (Evans, 2003, 2010; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Frankish, 2010; Kahneman, 2011; Pennycook, 2017), according to which there are two systems of thinking: one is intuitive, that is, non-conscious, automatic, fast, and heuristics-based (usually referred to as System 1), while the other is conscious, slow, deliberative, controlled, and reason-based (usually referred to as System 2). In most versions of these theories, emotions are connected to the operation of System 1 (Greene, et al., 2001; Haidt, 2001; Kahneman, 2011; Verweij, et al., 2015)1
Besides the difference between the broad reason-judgment perspective and the narrower moral-judgment perspective, there are at least two differences between the two theories that should be noted. First, for Haidt (2000, 2007), possible changes of the intuitive judgments are almost always a result of human interaction and communication, while for the dual-process proponents a change of the intuitive judgments is more closely linked with individual work of the higher-order system (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Frankish, 2010). Second, Haidt stresses that even when people change their intuitive judgments, they usually do it not for rational reasons, but rather on intuitive grounds, for example, emotional influence, or “motivations to agree with our friends and allies” (Haidt, 2000, p. 10; see also, Liao, 2011). Most dual-process adherents hold that changing our intuitive judgments involves reflective reasoning. Thus, the most prominent model of the dual-process theory (Bago & De Neys, 2020), the default interventionist model, posits that while our default responses are intuitive, they may be replaced “by effective type 2 reflective reasoning” (Evans & Stanovich, 2013, p. 236).
It is important to point out, however, that, like all the dual-process theories, the default interventionist model does not state that intuitive-based judgments are necessarily, or even very often, wrong. Rather, it supposes that because of their fast, emotional and heuristic foundation they are occasionally incorrect, and need to be validated by reason-judgment.
Both social intuitionist and dual-process theories offer evidence to support their position from various fields – neuroscience, psychology, and evolution theory. We will not delve here into this evidence, which can be found in many sources (see, e.g., Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Haidt, 2000; Kvaran, 2007; Lieberman, 2000; Luo et. al., 2013). Rather, we will use, as a point of reference, the basic assumption of both theories, that is, the dual structure that underlies cognition, judgment, and decision-making.