Graphical Modeling of Security Goals and Software Vulnerabilities

Graphical Modeling of Security Goals and Software Vulnerabilities

David Byers (Linköping University, Sweden) and Nahid Shahmehri (Linköping University, Sweden)
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-6359-6.ch001
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Abstract

Security has become recognized as a critical aspect of software development, leading to the development of various security-enhancing techniques, many of which use some kind of custom modeling language. Models in different languages cannot readily be related to each other, which is an obstacle to using several techniques together. The sheer number of languages is, in itself, also an obstacle to adoption by developers. The authors have developed a modeling language that can be used in place of four existing modeling languages: attack trees, vulnerability cause graphs, security activity graphs, and security goal indicator trees. Models in the new language can be transformed to and from the earlier language, and a precise definition of model semantics enables an even wider range of applications, such as testing and static analysis. This chapter explores this new language.
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Introduction

Modern society has rapidly become dependent on computers, and by extension dependent on computer software. As a result, the impact of software failure can be tremendous. Over the years we have seen software failures with consequences ranging from the amusingly absurd (Grisogono, 1999)1, to the terrifyingly lethal (Schmitt, 1991)2.

While most software failures are caused by flaws in the software being triggered unintentionally, some failures are the result of vulnerabilities being intentionally exploited. Over the last several decades the economic impact of the most publicized IT security incidents has been estimated to be tens of billions of dollars, worldwide (Hoy et al., 1989; Rhodes, 2001; Computer Economics, 2002, 2003). This does not include costs incurred by individuals or institutions due to e.g. identity theft or lost business. The total cost of cybercrime and cyber espionage was recently estimated at $100 billion per year (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2013). Security problems are not limited to mainstream computing. Serious vulnerabilities have been reported in industrial control systems, healthcare systems, automotive systems, and other kinds of embedded systems. The impact of vulnerabilities coupled with their prevalence in all kinds of software, clearly demonstrates that software security is a critical issue.

Our work concentrates on improving the ability of developers using conventional methods to address typical software security issues. Typical software security issues include the prevention of known vulnerabilities and the identification and fulfillment of common security goals. Known vulnerabilities account for nearly all publicly reported vulnerabilities, and failure to implement common security goals for nearly all design flaws we have observed.

We have developed a process improvement methodology, called S3P, that is based on detailed analysis of vulnerability causes (Byers, Ardi, Shahmehri, & Duma, 2006; Ardi, Byers, & Shahmehri 2006; Byers & Shahmehri, 2007, 2008, 2009; Byers, 2013). The S3P uses models to describe both vulnerability causes and mitigating activities. This work is complemented by the SHIELDS EU project (SHIELDS, n.d.), which developed a shared repository for security models, and tied together multiple model-based activities for secure software development.

In this chapter we present a graphical modeling language, the security goal model (SGM) language, that can be used in place of attack trees, security activity graphs (SAG), vulnerability cause graphs (VCG), and security goal indicator trees (SGIT). Table 1 summarizes these languages. An SGM shows how a given security goal can be fulfilled, and can be used for purposes as diverse as process improvement, automatic testing, static analysis, and manual inspection. Models in the traditional languages can be transformed to SGMs, and SGMs can be viewed using any of the traditional notations. This means that developers familiar with the older notations need not learn the SGM language unless they need the improvements the new language provides (Byers & Shahmehri, 2010).

Key Terms in this Chapter

Attack(n): Any interaction with a system with the purpose of causing a violation of the system’s security policy.

Cause(n): A condition or events that occurs during the software lifecycle and may contribute to a vulnerability in a software product.

Security Policy(n): A specification of what states of a given system are allowed, and which are not.

Security Model(n): A description of a phenomenon or behavior related to security, often simplified by abstracting certain details.

Vulnerability(n): A feature of a system that may be used in a way that results in a violation of a security policy. A vulnerability can be a specific instance, e.g. a specific flaw in a specific version of a product, or a class of vulnerabilities (e.g. buffer overflow or injection flaw ).

Security Activity(n): An activity or combination of activities applied during the system lifecycle that contributes towards fulfilling, or that fulfils, one or more security goals.

Security Goal(n): A goal that, when met, contributes to meeting some other security goal or ensures that one or more security properties desired by some stakeholder holds. Security goals are not always good things: a vulnerability can be considered a security goal since it contributes to meeting an attacker’s goal of a successful attack.

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