Identification Protocols

Introduction

The identification protocol is the scheme that checks an identity of the user that sent the message on open channel. The trusted authority validates an identity of a user that aims to send messages, or generates a new identity and certifies a user has a denoted identity. The only aim of an identification protocol is to check that a trusted authority is satisfied of an identity of that user. The identification protocol should convince a requirement that no hacker can impersonate the user assigned identity. In this regards this simple password is not acceptable since a hacker can eavesdrop and steal a password (Meier et al., 2013). The authorized receiver can become a hacker and use a password. To prevent this, identification code should be calculated from the private identity key that is not exposed. The user then creates its identity by proving the identity key. It should be computationally difficult to extract an identity key from an identification code. In result, an identity key plays a role of a password that is kept secret by the user and is never sent or exposed.

The identification protocol checks an identity of a user, called the claimant, by checking a user have possession the private key or password that only the user know. The claimant identifies itself to a verifier by proving it knows a private key without revealing it. The zero-knowledge protocol is one that a clamant proves it have a private key without revealing other information to a verifier or to the trusted authority intercepting the messages.

The identification scheme is secure if it is not disclose any information that subsequently allows another participant to falsely identify itself as a holder of an identity private. The identification scheme is sound if information of a private is enough for identification (Nikande et al., 2010). The community should bind a possession of a private to the general consensus regarding an identity of that user. This needs an existence of the trusted certification authority authenticated by a community. The trusted certification authority publicly published statement connecting an identity of a holder of a private. The identification protocol is carried out on the open channel, but must not disclose any information that will allow the following impersonation by a hacker that has intercepted a message. The identification protocol use time-variant parameters to build every example of its use unique. This is to stop replay attacks and interleaving attacks, to prevent some selected attacks and to guarantee uniqueness.

The identification scheme executes its job using the so-called challenge-response sequence. This sequence starts with the claim message from a claimant to a verifier, where a clamant needs verification. The verifier then responds with a challenge message to a claimant. The claimant posts the response message to a verifier and a verifier verifies for consistency of a claim message. If a claimant is a device, then a procedure checks an identity of a device not a user of a device. There still remains a possibility that a rightful possessor of a device is not the one using it. Therefore, a possessor of the device must participate in an identification protocol (Polikarpova et al., 2012).

The identification protocol should not vulnerable to the man-in-the-middle attack. The man in the middle is a hidden relay that intercepts, understands, alters and retransmits a message of the purpose of deception. The goal of the man in the middle is to steal an identity of the claimant by deceiving the protocol rather by breaking the scheme.