Literature Review

Literature Review

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-5225-1782-5.ch002
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Abstract

The broad nature of the literature reviewed to construct this model was necessary to provide the background regarding the interrelationships between the various theories of inputs and outcomes and their sometimes disjointed actual outcomes in reality. This chapter covers several aspects of actions taken by the allies after the cessation of hostilities to stabilize the society within the axis nations. It also examines the history of Afghanistan and the demography and culture. It concludes with an exploration of agent based modeling and why it is a useful tool for conducting this study. Issues ranging from military-NGO coordination to change capacity of the society as well as the legitimacy of the belligerents within the society are captured within this simulation and this literature review provides the context for the interpretation of the results of the simulations.
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Background

A lack of empathy, driven by greed, hubris, or lack of cultural understanding can lead to Tuchman’s (1969) definition of folly. The different approaches, one approach showing empathy and a respect for the change capacity of a vanquished foe, the other showing the opposite, can be found in the handling of Germany in the twentieth century. The vengeful stance that the Allies took with Germany after World War I is frequently cited as the casus belli for World War II by setting the conditions that allowed Hitler’s rise to power (Van Meter, 1979). But then after World War II, Germany (at least West Germany) had a completely different outcome.

The historic postwar transition effects on societies have been almost as traumatic as the lethal portion of the battles themselves. At the end of World War I, the victorious Allies came together at Versailles Palace in Paris to hammer out a peace treaty, the Treaty of Versailles. The treaty has historically been seen as a disaster as far as actually making peace. Given the costs paid by the Allies, both in blood and treasure and the mood of their respective electorates, the ability of the ‘Big Three’ democracies, Britain, France, and the United States, to make peace based upon reciprocity, was very low. The United States had the additional difficulty that isolationism was a very strong sentiment during that time. So much of an isolationist sentiment was present that the United States never ratified the Treaty of Versailles or became a member of the League of Nations (Dockrill & Fisher, 2001).

The case of Germany after World War II was quite different than that existing after World War I. The main difference in the situation on the ground was that the Allies had invaded and were occupying Germany. Much of the German infrastructure had been destroyed and resources were scarce. Many members of the disarmed German army were attempting to be captured by the Allied forces because prisoners of war were allotted the same rations as Allied soldiers, which was much better than the civilian population were able to attain. There were also a great number of displaced persons and disbanded German army personnel (still under arms) walking around the countryside making for an uncomfortable security situation. The positive aspect of the security situation was that none of these worrisome groups were organizing into an insurgency. The main problem faced by the Allied occupation forces was crime and reestablishing civil order. Unfortunately, one of the situations that remained the same between the wars was the propensity of the United States to rapidly withdraw manpower assets from the theater due to the rapid demobilization of its military. This made the security circumstances then, as it has in the recent past, problematic for commanders attempting to conduct stability operations (United States Army History Archives, 1947).

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