Provable Security for Outsourcing Database Operations

Provable Security for Outsourcing Database Operations

Sergei Evdokimov (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Germany), Matthias Fischmann (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Germany) and Oliver Günther (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Germany)
Copyright: © 2012 |Pages: 17
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-61350-323-2.ch712
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Abstract

Database outsourcing has become popular in recent years, although it introduces substantial security and privacy risks. In many applications, users may not want to reveal their data even to a generally trusted database service provider. Several researchers have proposed encryption schemes, such as privacy homomorphisms, that allow service providers to process confidential data sets without learning too much about them. In this paper, the authors discuss serious flaws of these solutions. The authors then present a new definition of security for homomorphic database encryption schemes that avoids these flaws and show that it is difficult to build a privacy homomorphism that complies with this definition. As a practical compromise, the authors present a relaxed variant of the security definition and discuss arising security implications. They present a new method to construct encryption schemes for exact selects and prove that the resulting schemes satisfy this notion.

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