The Role of Leakage and Warning Behaviors

Introduction

One of the key warning behaviors preceding and, in certain cases, predicting an act of mass violence is “leakage.” This phenomenon may be defined as the “communication to a third party [another person] of an intent to do harm to a target” (Meloy & O’Toole, 2011, p. 2). It is more subtle than making a direct threat against a target; yet, it still conveys an intent to cause harm. Coupled with any other available evidence, leakage can be used to assess the nature of the threat. “Leakage of their plans to third parties” was one of the eight warning behaviors theorized in Meloy and O’Toole’s (2011) typology model¹, which was devised as part of their review of school shooters in the United States and Germany. Aside from this warning behavior, the other proposed activities in the typology are the following: Pathway Warning Behavior, i.e. actions that signal the commencement of preparations for an attack; Fixation on the idea of carrying out an attack; Identification with other school shooters; Novel Aggression relating to violence other than the shooting; Energy Burst in the form of increased frequency of activities relating to the attack; Last Resort signaling desperation or distress and offering one final chance for things to change; Direct Threat of an attack. This chapter will firstly address the warning behavior of leakage in the typology. A sample of case studies will be examined, looking at the leakage displayed, which format it was in and to whom it was communicated. The chapter will then assess whether the remaining warning behaviors in Meloy and O’Toole’s (2011) typology were present in the same sample. Also discussed are the thoughts and experiences of interviewees working in the threat assessment field. These insights are useful for detailing real life experiences of leakage and other warning behaviors.

Eleven case studies were selected to assess leakage and the other warning behaviors in Meloy and O’Toole’s (2011) typology. The eleven incidents took place from 1986 through to 2019, giving a broad indication of the forms leakage took prior to and after the growth of the internet. These were selected from the list of worst mass shootings in the United States (CNN, 2020), whereby worst is defined in this context as the ones with the greatest death toll. A caveat to this is the original intention was to include the ten worst mass shootings on the list. The tenth case was the University of Texas shooting which resulted in sixteen deaths in 1966. The decision was reached to drop this incident, however, for several reasons. Firstly, due to it occurring over fifty years ago, it was difficult to locate relevant news media articles. Secondly, the presence of a brain tumor found in the perpetrator post-mortem may have played a part in his actions to a degree. The post-mortem was specifically requested by the perpetrator within his suicide note, presumably to explain why he was driven to act this way. Whilst it cannot be determined to what degree this influenced him, the worry was it may distort the overall results of the leakage inquiry. To that end, the decision was reached to include the next deadliest shooting on this list (CNN, 2020). Both the San Bernadino (2015) and Edmond Post Office (1986) attacks came joint eleventh on this list, with a death toll² of fourteen people. Both of these shootings are included in the final collection of case studies.

Four participants were interviewed for this chapter, selected for their experience and knowledge of the threat assessment process:

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  Heilit Biehl, a threat assessment coordinator in Adams 12 Five Star Schools, a K-12³ school district. This role which requires her to travel between schools in the region;

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  John-Nicolletti, one of the founders of Nicolletti-Flater Associates, which is a threat assessment and emergency management consultancy firm;

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  Stephen Brock and Melissa Reeves, the lead authors of the Prevent, Reaffirm, Evaluate, Provide and Respond, Examine (PREPaRE) School Crisis Prevention and Intervention curriculum. Melissa Reeves is also a Senior Consultant with SIGMA Threat Management Associates (SIGMATMA) and Associate Professor at Winthrop University; whilst Stephen Brock is currently affiliated to California State University (CSU), Sacramento, where he is a professor and school psychology program coordinator.

Interviewees were questioned about the role of leakage and other warning behaviors prior to mass shootings.