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What is Qualia

Handbook of Research on Synthetic Emotions and Sociable Robotics: New Applications in Affective Computing and Artificial Intelligence
Qualia (singular: quale) are the felt qualities of phenomena, as aspects of first-person (q.v.) or subjective (q.v.) experience. Examples of qualia are the feeling of warmth of a warm thing, the auditory experience of a C-major chord, the feeling in the gut of anger or fear, and so forth.
Published in Chapter:
Robots React, but Can They Feel?
Bruce J. MacLennan (University of Tennessee, USA)
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-60566-354-8.ch008
Abstract
This chapter addresses the “Hard Problem” of consciousness in the context of robot emotions. The Hard Problem, as defined by Chalmers, refers to the task of explaining the relation between conscious experience and the physical processes associated with it. For example, a robot can act afraid, but could it feel fear? Using protophenomenal analysis, which reduces conscious experience to its smallest units and investigates their physical correlates, we consider whether robots could feel their emotions, and the conditions under which they might do so. We find that the conclusion depends on unanswered but empirical questions in the neuropsychology of human consciousness. However, we do conclude that conscious emotional experience will require a robot to have a rich representation of its body and the physical state of its internal processes, which is important even in the absence of conscious experience.
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More Results
Qualia Learning?: Innerbodiment Construction and Machine Self-Learning by (Emotional) Imitation
The terms quale and qualia (pl.) are most commonly used to characterize the qualitative, experiential, or felt properties of mental states. Some philosophers take qualia to be essential features of all conscious mental states; others only of SENSATIONS and perceptions. In either case, qualia provide a particularly vexing example of the MIND-BODY PROBLEM, because it has been argued that their existence is incompatible with a physicalistic theory of the mind.
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