Welcome to the InfoSci Platform
Reference Hub5
SME E-Cooperation: A Theoretical Team Contract Analysis Under Hidden Information

SME E-Cooperation: A Theoretical Team Contract Analysis Under Hidden Information

María Verónica Alderete
Copyright: © 2012 |Volume: 8 |Issue: 1 |Pages: 12
ISSN: 1548-3673|EISSN: 1548-3681|EISBN13: 9781466610255|DOI: 10.4018/jec.2012010104
Cite Article Cite Article

MLA

Alderete, María Verónica. "SME E-Cooperation: A Theoretical Team Contract Analysis Under Hidden Information." IJEC vol.8, no.1 2012: pp.53-64. http://doi.org/10.4018/jec.2012010104

APA

Alderete, M. V. (2012). SME E-Cooperation: A Theoretical Team Contract Analysis Under Hidden Information. International Journal of e-Collaboration (IJeC), 8(1), 53-64. http://doi.org/10.4018/jec.2012010104

Chicago

Alderete, María Verónica. "SME E-Cooperation: A Theoretical Team Contract Analysis Under Hidden Information," International Journal of e-Collaboration (IJeC) 8, no.1: 53-64. http://doi.org/10.4018/jec.2012010104

Export Reference

Mendeley
Favorite Full-Issue Download

Abstract

Virtual Cooperation among SME firms can be analyzed from different theoretical perspectives. This paper considers e-cooperation among firms under asymmetric information. Firms cooperate jointly to produce some output or service, and they organize in teams whose firms’ characteristics are imperfectly observed. Suppose firms can observe their efforts or actions but they cannot observe the disutility of effort which they can discover after the contract is signed. The objective of this paper is to analyze virtual cooperation contracts under hidden information based on the original papers of Holmstrom (1982) and Rasmussen (1987). Some conditions are derived under which it is possible to implement an optimal sharing rule for a virtual team of SME under a hidden information frame.

Request Access

You do not own this content. Please login to recommend this title to your institution's librarian or purchase it from the IGI Global bookstore.