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The War against the Taliban: Tactical Operations and Strategic Moves

The War against the Taliban: Tactical Operations and Strategic Moves

Lucía Martínez Ordóñez, Jörg Schimmelpfennig
Copyright: © 2015 |Volume: 6 |Issue: 3 |Pages: 10
ISSN: 1947-8569|EISSN: 1947-8577|EISBN13: 9781466677555|DOI: 10.4018/IJSDS.2015070102
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MLA

Ordóñez, Lucía Martínez, and Jörg Schimmelpfennig. "The War against the Taliban: Tactical Operations and Strategic Moves." IJSDS vol.6, no.3 2015: pp.18-27. http://doi.org/10.4018/IJSDS.2015070102

APA

Ordóñez, L. M. & Schimmelpfennig, J. (2015). The War against the Taliban: Tactical Operations and Strategic Moves. International Journal of Strategic Decision Sciences (IJSDS), 6(3), 18-27. http://doi.org/10.4018/IJSDS.2015070102

Chicago

Ordóñez, Lucía Martínez, and Jörg Schimmelpfennig. "The War against the Taliban: Tactical Operations and Strategic Moves," International Journal of Strategic Decision Sciences (IJSDS) 6, no.3: 18-27. http://doi.org/10.4018/IJSDS.2015070102

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Abstract

Operation Enduring Freedom was hampered by a chronic shortage of attack helicopters available to ISAF forces in Afghanistan. Tactical operations into Taliban-held territory were launched even though close air support capable of dealing with “danger close” situations could not be assigned in advance. It led to significant ISAF casualties if the Taliban decided to fight back rather than withdraw. Departing from a Clausewitz-style, i.e. second-mover advantage, mixed-strategy equilibrium and taking account of the “Irregular Warfare” nature of the pay-offs, the paper looks into the existence of strategic moves. In particular, as playing a mixed strategy if rotary wing air support is unavailable merely incentivises a more aggressive Taliban response to any kind of operation due to the information asymmetry, it is argued that by moving away from the mixed-strategy equilibrium ISAF casualties in properly supported operations could be reduced, thus handing a first-mover advantage to ISAF.

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