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Game Theoretic Infrastructure Sharing in Wireless Cellular Networks

Game Theoretic Infrastructure Sharing in Wireless Cellular Networks

Alexandra Bousia, Elli Kartsakli, Angelos Antonopoulos, Luis Alonso, Christos Verikoukis
Copyright: © 2016 |Pages: 31
ISBN13: 9781466686427|ISBN10: 1466686421|EISBN13: 9781466686434
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-8642-7.ch014
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MLA

Bousia, Alexandra, et al. "Game Theoretic Infrastructure Sharing in Wireless Cellular Networks." Game Theory Framework Applied to Wireless Communication Networks, edited by Chungang Yang and Jiandong Li, IGI Global, 2016, pp. 368-398. https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-4666-8642-7.ch014

APA

Bousia, A., Kartsakli, E., Antonopoulos, A., Alonso, L., & Verikoukis, C. (2016). Game Theoretic Infrastructure Sharing in Wireless Cellular Networks. In C. Yang & J. Li (Eds.), Game Theory Framework Applied to Wireless Communication Networks (pp. 368-398). IGI Global. https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-4666-8642-7.ch014

Chicago

Bousia, Alexandra, et al. "Game Theoretic Infrastructure Sharing in Wireless Cellular Networks." In Game Theory Framework Applied to Wireless Communication Networks, edited by Chungang Yang and Jiandong Li, 368-398. Hershey, PA: IGI Global, 2016. https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-4666-8642-7.ch014

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Abstract

The emerging traffic demand has fueled the rapid densification of cellular networks. The increased number of Base Stations (BSs) leads to augmented energy consumption and expenditures for the Mobile Network Operators (MNOs), especially during low traffic, when many of the BSs remain underutilized. Hence, the MNOs are encouraged to provide “green” and cost effective solutions for their networks. In this chapter, an innovative algorithm for infrastructure sharing in two-operator environments is proposed, based on BSs switching off during low traffic periods. Motivated by the conflicting interests of the operators, the problem is formulated in a game theoretic framework that enables the MNOs to act individually to estimate the switching off probabilities that reduce their financial cost. The authors analytically and experimentally estimate the potential energy and cost savings that can be accomplished. The obtained results show a significant reduction in both energy consumption and expenditures, thus giving the operators the necessary incentives for infrastructure sharing.

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