Welcome to the InfoSci Platform
How to Tax a Monopoly Platform in a Product Differentiation Set-Up?: A Primer Based on Salop's Circular City Model

How to Tax a Monopoly Platform in a Product Differentiation Set-Up?: A Primer Based on Salop's Circular City Model

Sovik Mukherjee
Copyright: © 2020 |Pages: 24
ISBN13: 9781799811251|ISBN10: 1799811255|ISBN13 Softcover: 9781799811268|EISBN13: 9781799811275
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-7998-1125-1.ch027
Cite Chapter Cite Chapter

MLA

Mukherjee, Sovik. "How to Tax a Monopoly Platform in a Product Differentiation Set-Up?: A Primer Based on Salop's Circular City Model." Handbook of Research on Strategic Fit and Design in Business Ecosystems, edited by Umit Hacioglu, IGI Global, 2020, pp. 616-639. https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-7998-1125-1.ch027

APA

Mukherjee, S. (2020). How to Tax a Monopoly Platform in a Product Differentiation Set-Up?: A Primer Based on Salop's Circular City Model. In U. Hacioglu (Ed.), Handbook of Research on Strategic Fit and Design in Business Ecosystems (pp. 616-639). IGI Global. https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-7998-1125-1.ch027

Chicago

Mukherjee, Sovik. "How to Tax a Monopoly Platform in a Product Differentiation Set-Up?: A Primer Based on Salop's Circular City Model." In Handbook of Research on Strategic Fit and Design in Business Ecosystems, edited by Umit Hacioglu, 616-639. Hershey, PA: IGI Global, 2020. https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-7998-1125-1.ch027

Export Reference

Mendeley
Favorite

Abstract

The chapter models a monopoly platform with buyers on one side and sellers on the other. The platform charges some combination of a fixed membership fee and a variable usage fee from both the sides and the buyers are heterogeneous in terms of the per unit benefit they derive on the transaction of the product. In this digital era of IT-based business ecosystems, the big names in the digital business market have been accused of serious tax avoidance in countries where they operate. In this backdrop, the author introduces a baseline monopoly platform model for policy making purposes, incorporating both ad valorem and specific taxes on the buyers' side of the platform alone. But the results can be similarly interpreted for the seller side as well, without any loss of generality. The chapter gives us insights as to whether there is any cross-side externality working in the presence of product differentiation in standard monopoly platform models.

Request Access

You do not own this content. Please login to recommend this title to your institution's librarian or purchase it from the IGI Global bookstore.