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Mobile Phone and Autonomy

Mobile Phone and Autonomy

T. Chokvasin
Copyright: © 2007 |Pages: 13
ISBN13: 9781599043104|ISBN10: 1599043106|ISBN13 Softcover: 9781616927653|EISBN13: 9781599043128
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-59904-310-4.ch005
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MLA

Chokvasin, T. "Mobile Phone and Autonomy." Information Technology Ethics: Cultural Perspectives, edited by Soraj Hongladarom and Charles Ess, IGI Global, 2007, pp. 68-80. https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-59904-310-4.ch005

APA

Chokvasin, T. (2007). Mobile Phone and Autonomy. In S. Hongladarom & C. Ess (Eds.), Information Technology Ethics: Cultural Perspectives (pp. 68-80). IGI Global. https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-59904-310-4.ch005

Chicago

Chokvasin, T. "Mobile Phone and Autonomy." In Information Technology Ethics: Cultural Perspectives, edited by Soraj Hongladarom and Charles Ess, 68-80. Hershey, PA: IGI Global, 2007. https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-59904-310-4.ch005

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Abstract

This chapter is to offer a critical study of what the human living condition would be like in a new era of hi-tech mobilization, especially the condition of self-government or autonomy, and how, in the Thai perspective, the condition affects culture. Habermas’ analysis of individuation through socialization and Heidegger’s question concerning technology and being are used in the study, and it is revealed that we are now confronted with a new technological condition of positioned individuals in the universe of communication through mobile phones. This situation surely will be realized in a world highly mobilized by the phenomenon of connectedness. This means that we are concerning ourselves with our concrete individuality for our self-expression in that universe. I offer an interpretation that we would hold this kind of individuality to be valuable because of an effect from technological thinking. In addition, comparing this view on individuality with Buddhism, I found that the view offered here is not similar to the Buddhist concept of self as a construction. I offer an argument to show that these concepts are basically different for ethical reasons; while the Buddhist concept still preserves the nobility of the moral agent (Buddhism, after all, is a religion and needs to concern itself with morality), the concrete individuality discussed here is considered only as an instrumental value in a world of hi-tech mobilization.

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