Aggregate Searchable Encryption With Result Privacy

Aggregate Searchable Encryption With Result Privacy

Dhruti P. Sharma, Devesh C. Jinwala
ISBN13: 9781799877059|ISBN10: 1799877051|EISBN13: 9781799877486
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-7998-7705-9.ch043
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MLA

Sharma, Dhruti P., and Devesh C. Jinwala. "Aggregate Searchable Encryption With Result Privacy." Research Anthology on Artificial Intelligence Applications in Security, edited by Information Resources Management Association, IGI Global, 2021, pp. 922-945. https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-7998-7705-9.ch043

APA

Sharma, D. P. & Jinwala, D. C. (2021). Aggregate Searchable Encryption With Result Privacy. In I. Management Association (Ed.), Research Anthology on Artificial Intelligence Applications in Security (pp. 922-945). IGI Global. https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-7998-7705-9.ch043

Chicago

Sharma, Dhruti P., and Devesh C. Jinwala. "Aggregate Searchable Encryption With Result Privacy." In Research Anthology on Artificial Intelligence Applications in Security, edited by Information Resources Management Association, 922-945. Hershey, PA: IGI Global, 2021. https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-7998-7705-9.ch043

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Abstract

With searchable encryption (SE), the user is allowed to extract partial data from stored ciphertexts from the storage server, based on a chosen query of keywords. A majority of the existing SE schemes support SQL search query, i.e. 'Select * where (list of keywords).' However, applications for encrypted data analysis often need to count data matched with a query, instead of data extraction. For such applications, the execution of SQL aggregate query, i.e. 'Count * where (list of keywords)' at server is essential. Additionally, in case of semi-honest server, privacy of aggregate result is of primary concern. In this article, the authors propose an aggregate searchable encryption with result privacy (ASE-RP) that includes ASearch() algorithm. The proposed ASearch() performs aggregate operation (i.e. Count *) on the implicitly searched ciphertexts (for the conjunctive query) and outputs an encrypted result. The server, due to encrypted form of aggregate result, would not be able to get actual count unless having a decryption key and hence ASearch() offers result privacy.

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