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Luciano Floridi's Metaphysical Theory of Information Ethics: A Critical Appraisal and an Alternative Neo-Gewirthian Information Ethics

Luciano Floridi's Metaphysical Theory of Information Ethics: A Critical Appraisal and an Alternative Neo-Gewirthian Information Ethics

Edward Spence
Copyright: © 2010 |Volume: 6 |Issue: 1 |Pages: 14
ISSN: 1548-3908|EISSN: 1548-3916|ISSN: 1548-3908|EISBN13: 9781616929244|EISSN: 1548-3916|DOI: 10.4018/jthi.2010091701
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MLA

Spence, Edward. "Luciano Floridi's Metaphysical Theory of Information Ethics: A Critical Appraisal and an Alternative Neo-Gewirthian Information Ethics." IJTHI vol.6, no.1 2010: pp.1-14. http://doi.org/10.4018/jthi.2010091701

APA

Spence, E. (2010). Luciano Floridi's Metaphysical Theory of Information Ethics: A Critical Appraisal and an Alternative Neo-Gewirthian Information Ethics. International Journal of Technology and Human Interaction (IJTHI), 6(1), 1-14. http://doi.org/10.4018/jthi.2010091701

Chicago

Spence, Edward. "Luciano Floridi's Metaphysical Theory of Information Ethics: A Critical Appraisal and an Alternative Neo-Gewirthian Information Ethics," International Journal of Technology and Human Interaction (IJTHI) 6, no.1: 1-14. http://doi.org/10.4018/jthi.2010091701

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Abstract

This paper falls into five main parts. Part one, offers a critical analysis and evaluation of Luciano Floridi’s metaphysical theory of information ethics (IE). Drawing on part one, part two provides a discussion of what I consider to be the main conceptual and practical difficulties facing Floridi’s IE theory. Although in agreement with the overall motivation and objective that informs Floridi’s IE position, namely, that “all entities, qua informational objects, have an intrinsic moral value…” and that “there seems to be no good reason not to adopt a higher and more inclusive, ontocentric [moral] perspective” (Floridi, 2007, 10), part three of the paper proposes an alternative New-Gewirthian approach to Information Ethics that avoids some if not all of the difficulties facing Floridi’s own position. Part four then examines the implications for Floridi’s metaphysical theory of information ethics and finally, offers a conclusion in part five.

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