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Dynamic Modeling of the Cyber Security Threat Problem: The Black Market for Vulnerabilities

Dynamic Modeling of the Cyber Security Threat Problem: The Black Market for Vulnerabilities

Jaziar Radianti, Jose J. Gonzalez
Copyright: © 2009 |Pages: 22
ISBN13: 9781605663265|ISBN10: 1605663263|EISBN13: 9781605663272
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-60566-326-5.ch001
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MLA

Radianti, Jaziar, and Jose J. Gonzalez. "Dynamic Modeling of the Cyber Security Threat Problem: The Black Market for Vulnerabilities." Cyber Security and Global Information Assurance: Threat Analysis and Response Solutions, edited by Kenneth J. Knapp, IGI Global, 2009, pp. 1-22. https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-60566-326-5.ch001

APA

Radianti, J. & Gonzalez, J. J. (2009). Dynamic Modeling of the Cyber Security Threat Problem: The Black Market for Vulnerabilities. In K. Knapp (Ed.), Cyber Security and Global Information Assurance: Threat Analysis and Response Solutions (pp. 1-22). IGI Global. https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-60566-326-5.ch001

Chicago

Radianti, Jaziar, and Jose J. Gonzalez. "Dynamic Modeling of the Cyber Security Threat Problem: The Black Market for Vulnerabilities." In Cyber Security and Global Information Assurance: Threat Analysis and Response Solutions, edited by Kenneth J. Knapp, 1-22. Hershey, PA: IGI Global, 2009. https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-60566-326-5.ch001

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Abstract

This chapter discusses the possible growth of black markets (BMs) for software vulnerabilities and factors affecting their spread. It is difficult to collect statistics about BMs for vulnerabilities and their associated transactions, as they are hidden from general view. We conduct a disguised observation of online BM trading sites to identify causal models of the ongoing viability of BMs. Our observation results are expressed as a system dynamic model. We implement simulations to observe the effects of possible actions to disrupt BMs. The results suggest that without interventions the number and size of BMs is likely to increase. A simulation scenario with a policy to halt BM operations results in temporary decrease of the market. The intervention ultimately meets policy resistance, failing to neutralize a reinforcing feedback. Combining the policy with efforts to build distrust among BM participants may cause them to leave the forum and inhibit the imitation process to establish similar forums.

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