ABSTRACT

A method preserving cyber-physical systems to operate safely in a joint physical space is presented. It comprises the model-based development of the control software and simulators for the continuous physical environment as well as proving the models for spatial and real-time properties. The corresponding toolchain is based on the model-based engineering tool Reactive Blocks and the spatial model checker BeSpaceD. The real-time constraints to be kept by the controller are proven using the model checker UPPAAL.

KEYWORDS

BeSpaceD, Model-Based System Engineering, Reactive Blocks, Real-Time Properties, Spatial Behavior Modeling and Verification

1. INTRODUCTION

In safety critical domains like aviation, automotive and robotics, autonomous cyber-physical systems interact with each other in the same physical space. To avoid damage and injuries, the control software of the systems has to guarantee spatiotemporal properties like collision avoidance or the cooperation of several units that carry a heavy workpiece together. A popular way for the creation of functionally correct and safe system software is the application of integrated modeling and verification tools like MATLAB/Simulink (Tyagi, 2012). Our contribution is the combination of such a tool with efficient provers allowing to verify that the coordinated behavior of multiple controlled cyber-physical systems fulfills relevant spatial safety properties. We introduce a toolchain combining the model-based engineering tool-set Reactive Blocks (Kraemer, Slåtten, & Herrmann, 2009) with the verification...
tool BeSpaceD (Blech & Schmidt, 2013). In particular, we use a development workflow starting with the collection of requirements for a cyber-physical system and its architecture followed by the steps listed below:

1. Spatiotemporal properties of components are described in the input language of BeSpaceD;
2. A model of the system controller is created in Reactive Blocks. We compose it with a simulator model of the continuous system parts which is created using the BeSpaceD model developed in step 1;
3. The built-in model checker of Reactive Blocks is used to check the combined controller and simulator model for general design errors (Kraemer, Slåtten, & Herrmann, 2009);
4. If the checks in step 3 are passed, the software model is transformed to the input language of BeSpaceD;
5. Assuming certain maximum reaction times of the discrete controller, it is verified with BeSpaceD that the model resulting from the transformation in step 3 fulfills the spatiotemporal properties defined in step 1;
6. The model checker UPPAAL (Bengtsson, et al., 1996) is applied to prove that the real-time properties assumed in the proofs of step 5 are indeed kept by the Reactive Blocks model created in step 2 (Han & Herrmann, 2013), (Han, Herrmann, & Le, 2013);
7. By using the code generator from Reactive Blocks (Kraemer & Herrmann, 2007), (Kraemer, Herrmann, & Bræk, 2006) executable Java code of the controller and, if desired, of the simulator of the continuous behavior is created. The generated code can be deployed on the system components running the control software of the embedded system.

Our approach has to guarantee that a model developed with Reactive Blocks indeed fulfills the desired safety properties if the verifications in steps 5 and 6 succeed. Formally, that proof is merely trivial: Be $S$ the logical formula corresponding to a system model in Reactive Blocks according to (Kraemer & Herrmann, 2010), $P$ the conjoined spatial behavioral properties to be fulfilled by $S$, and $R(t)$ a statement describing that the controller always guarantees a maximum reaction time $t$. Using BeSpaceD, we verify in step 5 that the system fulfills the safety properties if $t$ is kept, i.e., $S \land R(t) \Rightarrow P$. In step 6, we prove with UPPAAL that the system guarantees the maximum reaction time, i.e., $S \Rightarrow R(t)$. It is evident that the combination of the two proofs implies $S \Rightarrow P$ such that the Reactive Blocks model created in step 2 effectively fulfills the spatial properties defined in step 1.

Further, we have to argue whether our model is indeed a correct abstraction of the real physical system in which the generated code of the controller shall be used. In particular, it is important to understand if and under which conditions the real system may violate $P$ even if the two proof steps succeed. Preserving safety properties throughout refinement and reuse of verification results achieved on abstract models has been studied in the past, e.g., (Loiseaux, Graf, Sifakis, Bouajjani, & Bensalem, 1995) and is especially important in the context of model checking. When regarding space, we distinguish here between the following:

- **Overapproximation of spatial behavior**: For instance, the size of a spatial area occupied by a unit can be extended for proving the absence of collisions. This enables us to reuse previous spatial proofs if the sizes of a physical model do not exceed the overapproximated ones taken as a basis in the former proof;
- **Underapproximation of spatial behavior**: Just as the overapproximations, we can, for example, underapproximate sensor ranges that allow the detection of other units, such that established properties can be reused in later development stages;
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