Chapter 6
Science, Ethics, and Weapons Research

John Forge
Independent Researcher, Australia

ABSTRACT

If it were not for weapons research, there would be no predator drones or smart bombs or improvised explosive devices or assault rifles. The insurgents in the Middle East and elsewhere would have no means to fight, and there would be no wars, large or small. The main issue for ethics and weapons research centers on the moral evaluation of this kind of activity: Is it ever morally justified to design the means to kill, harm, and destroy, and if so, under precisely what circumstances? Turning to science and its relation to weapons research, the question here, leaving aside ethics for the moment, is the role that science plays in weapons research. Perhaps weapons research is a wholly (applied) scientific endeavor or perhaps science is a part of weapons research.

INTRODUCTION

If it were not for weapons research, there would be no predator drones or smart bombs or improvised explosive devices or assault rifles. The insurgents in the Middle East and elsewhere would have no means to fight, and there would be no wars, large or small. Even more importantly, there would be no vast arsenals of thermonuclear weapons capable of ending much of the sentient life on the planet. The world would then most certainly be a safer place. But weapons research is not something new: the gunpowder weaponry of the early modern period was the product of research, as were the torsion catapults in Greece at the time of Philip and Alexander of Macedon. Whatever else is true about weapons research, it is clear that it introduces new (or improved) means of killing and destruction, and this is sufficient to define the activity. This would appear to be a very weighty matter, something that one might imagine philosophers, and others who think about such things, would have had a lot to say; surprisingly, not much at all has been written on the subject, though some explanation of this neglect will be given in this chapter.

The main issue for ethics and weapons research centers on the ethical or moral evaluation of the activity: Is it ever morally justified to design the means to kill, harm and destroy, and if so, under precisely what circumstances? Turning to science and its relation to weapons research, the question here is the
role that science plays in weapons research. Perhaps weapons research is a wholly (applied) scientific
endeavour or perhaps science is a part of weapons research? Bringing ethics back in, if weapons research
is deemed morally wrong, then is it the case that whatever role science plays is also wrong? To answer
these questions, three examples will be given which will help to clarify the roles that science can play
in weapons research. If weapons research itself is understood as applied science, as it is by Arrigo for
instance (Arrigo 2000: 303), then one might expect this to entail the application of theory to the design
for new weapons, for true or radical innovation. But there are other ways in which science can inform
weapons research, as will be seen presently. Before moving on to these examples, it is worth making
some general, and very brief, comments about ethics and the way it can apply to an intellectual activity
such as science. This is worth doing because it cannot be assumed that the audience for the present topic
is familiar with philosophy or ethics, but it is necessary to have a framework.2

BACKGROUND

A straightforward way to describe ethics is to say that it is a study which deals with what persons ought
and ought not to do. It is thus to do with the choices, actions and behaviour of mature competent people.
Some of the things that people do do not affect others, other humans, other sentient beings, in any sig-
nificant way and hence these do not come under the purview of ethics. Those actions that do affect others
are, however, open to moral or ethical evaluation: are they right or are they wrong? To resolve that ques-
tion, one needs to appeal to a moral system. All such systems forbid certain actions, namely those that
inflict unjustified harm on others. This is surely intuitive and obvious: no one wants to be harmed. It is
almost by definition that no sentient being wants to feel pain - assuming that the pain does not indicate
that some medical treatment is working or some such – and to be in pain is one form of being harmed.
Some moral systems require people not only to refrain from harming others but also to provide some
positive benefit for them. Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, the nineteenth century English phi-
losophers, famously believed that one ought to strive to increase the amount of happiness in the world.
However, morality is supposed to be impartial in the sense that it forbids discrimination in regard to
moral action. Prohibitions on harming do not end with family or friends or community or country: no-
body should be harmed, no one at all. Some critics of the style of morality advocated by Bentham and
Mill have pointed out that it is impossible to increase the amount of happiness in the world impartially:
no one can make everyone happy! Just how serious this objection is is a matter of ongoing debate. But
it is only necessary here to note that this kind of moral system shares the prohibition on harming with
the former kind: for the topic at hand, it is clear that the moral evaluation of weapons research, whatever
else it might involve, will not be such as to see it as an activity which aims to increase the amount of
happiness in the world.

Most philosophers do not believe that the dictates of morality are absolute and cannot be broken in
any circumstances. For example, most accept that a moral rule such as “Do not cause pain” has justified
exceptions. Clearly, a dentist who inflicts pain on her patient to save his teeth has not done something
morally wrong – provided that the patient understands and assents to the treatment. Also, it is generally
agreed that it is permissible to cause pain in self-defence, if that is the only way to defend oneself. This
leads to the view that justifiable exceptions to the overall moral prohibition against harming will be such
as to show that the harm inflicted will prevent other harms. Just how this is worked out will vary from
case to case, and it is here that much of the hard work in ethical reflection and evaluation takes place.