Public and Private Partner Selection in Battle of Sexes

Public and Private Partner Selection in Battle of Sexes

Pedro Mariano, Davide Nunes, Luís Correia
DOI: 10.4018/IJARAS.2015070103
OnDemand:
(Individual Articles)
Available
$37.50
No Current Special Offers
TOTAL SAVINGS: $37.50

Abstract

In this paper the authors investigate what factors can promote population diversity. They compare different partner selection models and strategy mobility on the Battle of Sexes game. This is a game with a coordination dilemma where players must decide which event to attend given that each one has its preferred event but they prefer going together. They investigate two types of partner selection: one based in private information and another based on public information, which is based on an opinion model. The authors analyze two variants of the opinion model. Experimental analysis shows that partner selection plays a minor role of favoring population diversity. One of the most important factors is strategy mobility either implicitly through mutation or explicitly when an offspring is placed in a different location.
Article Preview
Top

There is research on partner selection (Izquierdo, Izquierdo, & Vega-Redondo, 2010; Pacheco, Traulsen, & Nowak, 2006; Santos, Pacheco, & Lenaerts, 2006; Zimmermann & Eguíluz, 2005; Aktipis, 2004; Semmann, Krambeck, & Milinski, 2003; Hauert, 2002; Stanley, Ashlock, & Smucker, 1995; Orbell & Dawes, 1993; Vanberg, 1992). However, these models are often tailored for a specific game such as PGP or IPD (Izquierdo, Izquierdo, & Vega-Redondo, 2010; Aktipis, 2004).

Research similar to ours is (Santos, Pacheco, & Lenaerts, 2006; Pacheco, Traulsen, & Nowak, 2006) where population structure is able to evolve. Players are embedded in a network. If a player can change his links, selection favors cooperators that prefer to maintain links with their kin and to drop links with defectors. However, their findings were done in 2-player games and they only considered two types of strategies.

Research on opinion dynamics (Deffuant, Amblard, & Faure, 2002; Hegselmann & Krause, 2002; Groeber, Schweitzer, & Press, 2009) has largely focused on how a group of agents can reach a consensus in the presence of extremists. There is some research were interactions are mediated by some game (Helbing & Johansson, 2010), although they focus on cooperative games.

Complete Article List

Search this Journal:
Reset
Open Access Articles: Forthcoming
Volume 7: 1 Issue (2016)
Volume 6: 2 Issues (2015)
Volume 5: 4 Issues (2014)
Volume 4: 4 Issues (2013)
Volume 3: 4 Issues (2012)
Volume 2: 4 Issues (2011)
Volume 1: 4 Issues (2010)
View Complete Journal Contents Listing