The main thesis defended by this paper is the thesis of the autonomy – i.e., non-reducibility -- of the phenomenic level of analysis of the psyche. The thesis will be defended by exploiting four main ideas: (1) the theory of levels of reality, (2) the distinction between act and object of presentation, (3) the structure of internal time, and (4) the distinction between egological and non egological acts. I shall present these theses from the point of view of the experiments conducted by Meinong and his pupils, notably Benussi, first at Graz and then at Padua. I may therefore claim that I am here adopting the point of view of what has been called experimental phenomenology, meaning the experimental study of phenomenic or first-person experiences.
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