Attributed State Actors

Attributed State Actors

Copyright: © 2021 |Pages: 33
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-7998-3979-8.ch004
OnDemand:
(Individual Chapters)
Available
$37.50
No Current Special Offers
TOTAL SAVINGS: $37.50

Abstract

Chapter 4 looks at the technical aspects and effects of some attributed and high-profile state-sponsored cyber-attacks that have been encountered through our interaction with the networked world. Coverage also includes a look at the approach of nation-states against commercial companies as well as government institutions to achieve various objectives. The author uses these scenarios to focus attention on the important pillars of cyber security that all have important interrelationships in safeguarding of data and information. Within the context of their implementation, a weakness or series of weaknesses within one or more pillars can be enough to facilitate a cyber-attack. These pillars are underpinned by important factors, and the impact of improper cyber security considerations can be directly and indirectly problematic to continued e-commerce and our constructive evolution of knowledge sharing across the internet.
Chapter Preview
Top

Introduction

In this chapter, the author discusses a number of cyber-attacks by state actors colloquially known as the ‘high threat club.’ The author uses the analysis of these high-profile security breaches to outline how society may better defend itself during users’ interaction with cyberspace. The author will build upon examples provided in Chapter 3 to discuss the following categories of attacker groups (Chinnaswamy & Milford, 2019):

  • Industrial Espionage Campaigns: First, industrial espionage campaigns target users to deploy home grown exploits and zero-days in order to exfiltrate data over protracted periods of time. As the author alluded to in Chapter 1, some hacker groups can be affiliated or used by nation-states to avoid attribution, and therefore, they may achieve their own goals and those of the state, potentially at the same time.

  • State Actors: State actors undertake state-sponsored activities using weaponized malware to perform economic, espionage, or politically influenced actions by infiltrating many different public and private organizations and institutions. Depending on the actor, this may involve seeking financial reward for the state or even in some cases, seeking out PII.

Top

Background

In 2019, a little-known hacker group called 0v1ru$, which was aligned with the Digital Revolution group, hacked the Russian company SyTech. This contractor has been involved in cyber capability development on behalf of the Russian state-actor Federal'naya sluzhba bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii (FSB) and had already been targeted by Digital Revolution in the past. This was the largest cyber-attack against the FSB, revealing 7.5 Terabytes of leaked secret projects, including a number of interesting capabilities such as The Onion Router (TOR) network de-anonymization project linked to the Kvant Research Institute (Abrams, 2019; Doffman, 2019). This haul has been appended by another series of tools also attained by Digital Revolution after a cyber-attack against the Kvant Research Institute and provided evidence of state sponsored Mirai malware use in 2016. In addition, this breach reveals the Russian Government’s intention of targeting and attacking IoT devices through capabilities developed under the Fronton Program (Asif, 2020). Researchers stipulated that the use of default passwords, or hard coded credentials for that matter, was the instigator that allowed the Mirai botnet to infiltrate Linux-based commodity IoT (Hellard, 2018). This is just a small taste of the efforts, deviousness, and capabilities that can be used by state-actors.

Historically, researchers have blamed Russia and China for cyber-espionage activities, but the weaponization of cyberspace that has been gradually building over the second decade of the new millennium includes others, such as Syria, Iran, and Vietnam. Even the U.S. Office of Tailored Access Operations, which came to light after the Edward Snowden revelations, has also been branded an APT (Leclare, 2015; Zetter, 2016; Geary, 2018). FireEye has published a list of prolific APT groups attributed as nation-state actors. State-sponsored groups do not necessarily have to carry the APT tag and may hail using pseudonyms or aliases (Stirparo, 2015; FireEye, 2020) just like hackers. This chapter investigates a variety of infamous state-sponsored cyber-attacks and lessons that can be learned from these attacks.

Key Terms in this Chapter

Jump Boxes: Used as an additional authentication barrier for administrators to log in to other assets on the network such as servers in a different security zone.

Server Message Block: Used to share files between file shares over a network.

Social engineering: Uses various real-world and electronic methods to coerce users into unknowingly facilitate a compromise whether it be revealing credentials or trying to persuade them to click on a malicious URL link or malware laden file.

Dropper: A trojan horse that is used to download further malicious software payloads and tools in order to conduct further stages of a cyber-attack.

Credential Stuffing: An unauthorized authentication attempt reusing a limited number of guessed or compromised passwords from a previous breach.

Cyber Operations: A sequence of actions that are conducted through cyberspace to achieve an objective which may inflict harm to technology or potentially upon human beings.

Onion Router: An obfuscation network of proxies used to encrypt traffic between TOR entry and exit nodes that is synonymous with the Dark Web, although it is not explicitly used by cyber-crime.

Federal'naya sluzhba bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii: Known by the acronym FSB, this organization is the Russian internal security service, akin to the legacy KGB, whose mission is to protect the interests of the homeland, but this group can operate outside Russia’s borders.

Wormable: A term used to highlight worms that can propagate without a need to conduct authentication on a system.

GoToMyPC: A Citrix service that enables signed up users to remotely access their own computers.

Password Spraying: A more refined variant of credential stuffing but across a large number of accounts.

Hash: A digital digest that represents inputted data as unique values after being passed through a one-way cryptographic function. Some hashes, like MD5, are susceptible to a collision state that enables more than one copy of a value to be created.

Complete Chapter List

Search this Book:
Reset