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Myanmar is ethnically very diverse, with about 135 ethnic groups making up its population of approximately 54 million people (Myanmar Population and Household Census, 2014). It is described as one of the world’s most disaster-prone countries given its exposure to multiple hazards, which include floods, cyclones, earthquakes, landslides, and droughts. Myanmar ranks second out of 187 countries in the 2016 Global Climate Risk Index and ninth out of 191 countries on the Index for Risk Management (World Bank Report, 2018). A pertinent example is cyclone Nargis of May 2008, which turned out to be the most devastating natural disaster in the history of the country, resulting in a loss of 140,000 human lives (UNOCHA, 2019).
Moreover, aside from its vulnerability to natural disaster, Myanmar continues to face significant humanitarian challenges related to the recent crisis in Rakhine state, the large-scale displacement of people, an ongoing armed conflict in some parts of the country, and inter-communal tensions. The United Nations (UN) 2018 Interim Humanitarian Response Plan indicates that there are 43 INGOs and 8 UN organizations that are providing humanitarian aid and development activities in affected regions of the country. However, whether humanitarian operations have positively or negatively impacted Myanmar is underreported. On the other hand, a backlash against INGOs arose in post-2012, and suspicions about misappropriation of aid resources and mismanagement of funds seem to have become more controversial after the aid agencies plunged themselves into the Rakhine crisis under the agenda of humanitarian violations (Jacobs, 2017; Myo Oo, 2017).
Another interesting point is that this backlash and mistrust of the INGOs was exposed after the military regime era, although this is not something scholars and observers often highlight in regard to the perception of locals in relation to past INGOs. For example, according to past empirical studies in Myanmar, the aid is perceived as a “donation” [ahlu] in the Buddhist sense (Brac de la Perriere, 2010), and the donor is regarded as a “master of donation” [ahu shin] (Boutry, 2008). In addition, according to South et al., (2011), based on the findings of studying INGO operations in the Delta region in the aftermath of the Nargis cyclone, the beneficiaries in the Delta region would not voice any discontent regarding INGO action because they were afraid of being excluded from the distribution lists or of being identified as members of problematic villages in relation to the donation (humanitarian aid).
Notably, in 2017 aid operations were severely disrupted in conflict areas. This disruption entailed the following: refusing travel visas to most INGOs and some UN agencies; a marked unwillingness of the locals to do any business with aid agencies (Arkin, 2017); and the public accusations that INGOs were backing terrorists and encouraging a war in the Rakhine State (Holmes, 2017). On the other hand, the INGO forum of Myanmar (2017) portrayed the people of Myanmar as being anti-INGO and violent towards aid workers. Why were Myanmar citizens’ skeptical attitudes toward INGOs portrayed in such a negative manner during the post-democracy period?