An Agent-Based Model of Insurance and Protection Decisions on IT Systems

An Agent-Based Model of Insurance and Protection Decisions on IT Systems

Juan Luis Santos (Institute of Economic and Social Analysis, University of Alcalá, Alcalá de Henares, Spain)
Copyright: © 2015 |Pages: 17
DOI: 10.4018/IJATS.2015070101


This paper discusses the key role of incentives in information systems security. Vulnerabilities can be reduced, and even removed, if individual motivations are taken into account in the process of protection and insurance design. The article first discusses the importance of externalities, free-riding behavior, uncertainty and the incentives mismatch between individuals and organizations involved in information systems security. Previous works perform this study using a game theoretical approach but the paper shows that an agent-based model is capable of including the heterogeneity and interrelations among individuals, not focusing on the reached equilibrium but on the dynamics prior to its emergence.
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2. Role Of Incentives In Information Systems

In this section the main findings of economics of security applied works are reviewed and it is discussed how these issues may be included within a game theory framework and how they can be incorporated into an agent-based model.

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