Achieving Secure and Privacy-Preserving in Mobile Social Networks

Achieving Secure and Privacy-Preserving in Mobile Social Networks

Mohamed Amine Ferrag (Guelma University, Algeria) and Abdelaziz Amara korba (Badji Mokhtar-Annaba University, Algeria)
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-5225-8407-0.ch006
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This chapter proposes a security framework for achieving secure and privacy-preserving mobile social networks named ASPP. Based on the cooperative neighbor, reactive routing protocol, and short signatures technique, the proposed scheme can not only detect and avoid but also can preserve the message privacy against elemental attacks and compound attacks. In addition, ASPP is robust against eavesdropping attack, wormhole attack, packet analysis attack, packet tracing attack, and replay attack. Extensive analyses and experiments are given to demonstrate its high detection rate and practicability under various scenarios.
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A mobile social network fueled with heterogeneous wireless infrastructures (e.g., cellular/ WiFi) and mobile devices (e.g., smartphones, tablets), which can facilitate multimedia services by providing ubiquitous connections between service providers and users in a mobile environment (Zhang et al., 2014). Mobile social networks still face many security and privacy challenges, including private information leakage, cheating detection, Sybil attacks, DDoS attacks and so on (Liang et al., 2014). Based on spoofed identities, pseudonyms, locations, and profiles, an adversary can launch active or passive attacks (deliberately delays, drops, corrupts, or modifies messages) in order to steal the social data as well as to damage P2P communications (Ferrag et al., 2016). According to the work (Ferrag et al., 2017), the privacy preservation models for mobile social networks can be divided into location privacy, identity privacy, anonymity, traceability, interest privacy, backward privacy, and content-oriented privacy.

In this chapter, to address both security and performance challenges in ad hoc social networks, we propose a security framework for achieving secure and privacy preserving in mobile social networks, called ASPP, for ad hoc social communications. With the proposed ASPP scheme, each node user can be privacy-preserving authenticated before joining other nodes using routing protocol. The contributions of this chapter are fourfold.

  • First, we formalize the system model where we consider the social characteristics, i.e., human mobility, human group and preferences in a typical MANET which consists of trusted authority (TA), some stationary social unit (SU) deployed at the social space, and a large number of mobile equipped with WiFi technology moving on a social space. Next, we improve the AODV routing protocol basing on some concepts of social theory to be suitable for ad hoc social communications, i.e., degree centrality, closeness centrality, and betweenness centrality.

  • Second, we propose an efficient certificate scheme, where the TA issues the private key 978-1-5225-8407-0.ch006.m01 and certificate 978-1-5225-8407-0.ch006.m02 using the Schnorr signature algorithm (Schnorr, 1991). The node 978-1-5225-8407-0.ch006.m03 can verify the certificate 978-1-5225-8407-0.ch006.m04 by the procedure 978-1-5225-8407-0.ch006.m05 and cannot use these certificates directly in ad hoc social communication. Based on the proxy re-signature cryptography technology (Toshiyuki et al., 2013), the node request 978-1-5225-8407-0.ch006.m06 resignature key from 978-1-5225-8407-0.ch006.m07 and then re-signs the certificates issued by the TA to be the same as those issued by 978-1-5225-8407-0.ch006.m08 itself. With this method of key distribution, the proposed ASPP scheme guarantees the node identity confidentiality.

  • Third, we provide conditional privacy preservation to the nodes with demand response. Although the SU act as certificate issuers in ASPP, they do not know what certificates are held by a node. Therefore, the adversaries cannot trace the interested nodes although they had compromised all SU. Then, to detect and verify the attack against routing protocol, based on three control messages 978-1-5225-8407-0.ch006.m09, each node initiates a response request and send 978-1-5225-8407-0.ch006.m10 signed to nodes in its routing table at 1-hop, and waits the response of his request for runs the notification phase. After receiving a request response, the node checks its signature. If valid and 978-1-5225-8407-0.ch006.m11, it considers that the link with the node is proved. Otherwise, it returns suspicious and starts the notification phase.

  • Finally, to validate the efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed ASPP, we integrate in the AODV implementation, being the modified protocol designated AODV-ASPP. Extensive simulation results in the first scenario show that the proposed ASPP scheme can detect the black hole attack more in the configuration where attack is launched on a number of more hops. Thus, in the second scenario, we focus on the transmission delay of ASPP at the node with extensive performance evaluation, which further convinces its practicality.

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