Cancellable Biometrics for On-line Signature Recognition

Cancellable Biometrics for On-line Signature Recognition

Emanuele Maiorana (Università degli Studi Roma TRE, Italy), Patrizio Campisi (Università degli Studi Roma TRE, Italy) and Alessandro Neri (Università degli Studi Roma TRE, Italy)
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-60960-515-5.ch020


With the widespread diffusion of biometrics-based recognition systems, there is an increasing awareness of the risks associated with the use of biometric data. Significant efforts are therefore being dedicated to the design of algorithms and architectures able to secure the biometric characteristics, and to guarantee the necessary privacy to their owners. In this work we discuss a protected on-line signature-based biometric recognition system, where the considered biometrics are secured by applying a set of non-invertible transformations, thus generating modified templates from which retrieving the original information is computationally as hard as random guessing it. The advantages of using a protection method based on non-invertible transforms are exploited by presenting three different strategies for the matching of the transformed templates, and by proposing a multi-biometrics approach based on score-level fusion to improve the performances of the considered system. The reported experimental results, evaluated on the public MCYT signature database, show that the achievable recognition rates are only slightly affected by the proposed protection scheme, which is able to guarantee the desired security and renewability for the considered biometrics.
Chapter Preview

Biometric Template Security

Among the possible threats regarding users' privacy and security which have to be considered when designing a biometrics-based recognition systems, the unauthorized acquisition of the stored biometric data is probably the most dangerous one (Ratha, 2001). Therefore, many solutions have been investigated in the recent past to secure biometric templates. Among them, cancelable biometrics approaches have been introduced in (Ratha, 2001). These techniques apply intentional non-invertible and repeatable modifications to the original biometric templates. Specifically, a properly defined cancelable biometrics should satisfy the following requirements:

  • Security: it should be impossible or computationally unfeasible to obtain the original biometric template from the transformed one;

  • Revocability: it should be possible to revoke a compromised template and issue a new one based on the same biometric data;

  • Diversity: each template generated from a biometrics should not match with others previously generated from the same data;

  • Performance: the recognition performance of the protected system, in terms of False Rejection Rate (FRR) or False Acceptance Rate (FAR), should not degrade significantly with respect to an unprotected system.

Complete Chapter List

Search this Book: