The Ukrainians are no longer merely seeking to end this conflict; they are striving to end Russia's influence in their country and Eastern Europe by extension, and they are determined to join NATO and the European Union because this is the only guarantee of their objective. This determination even persuaded scholars such as Kissinger to endorse their cause, clearly proving that even the most pragmatic thinkers can support the grand strategy of the Zelensky doctrine. Kissinger opposed Ukraine's transatlantic aspirations throughout the majority of his professional life. His initial peace proposal in 2022 also suggested the traditional solution of freezing the conflict, but this was strongly criticized by Ukrainians and specialists in the field. Partly in response to this criticism and after a period of extended contemplation, Kissinger presented a reformulated response endorsing Ukraine's NATO membership as an “appropriate outcome.” Kissinger's shift in position can be seen as a substantial boost to the transatlantic aspirations of embattled Ukraine.
“The task of the leader is to get his people from where they are to where they have not been.” -Henry Kissinger
TopIntroduction
The chapter is a natural continuation of the recent publication titled Dealing with Regional Conflicts of Global Importance (2024), which suggested that among other important things, the escalation of the Ukraine war in 2022 shows the need for readjustments in IR theory, especially in respect of the conflict management. That publication foresaw the launch of a broader debate on the future of IR theory in respect of dealing with regional conflicts and specifically advocated reevaluating our approach to the conflict in Ukraine. It was argued that the best way to approach this issue is to launch a broader debate that reevaluates the way colleagues in the field approach various positions, paradigms, methods, and theories that contribute to the vast and constantly expanding body of knowledge that is compartmentalized as the IR theory. It was argued that our strategic culture has two main ways of approaching this issue: by either engaging in a more holistic inter-paradigmatic approach or by a more focused and concrete scrutiny of individual events, outcomes, concepts, positions or ways of doing things. This project falls into the second category, for it aims to scrutinize the shift in position of one geostrategic practitioner, who, as a result of the events of February 2022, changed his opinion about Ukraine’s potential geostrategic choices, and this simple shift of his opinions may have a considerable impact on our discipline, maybe not overnight but surely before long. He does not belong to our traditions but his contributions to the field and its literature cover various fields of social science and the history of diplomacy. The main purpose of this chapter is to bring to the fore a considerable shift in the positions of Henry Kissinger on the broader geostrategic ramifications of Russia’s war in Ukraine in the context of the debate on Ukraine’s transatlantic aspirations.
Prior to 2022, Kissinger believed Ukraine should not be allowed to join NATO, for it would infuriate Russia, risk shaking the foundation of the global architecture of power, and possibly provoke a nuclear exchange. On countless occasions prior to the outbreak of the full-scale confrontation between Russia and Ukraine, Kissinger categorically dismissed Ukraine’s NATO membership, as it could only weaken NATO. The conflict in Ukraine, however, made Kissinger shift his position to one far more accommodating, and, ultimately, he considered that an outcome that had seemed to him science fiction just a few months before could materialize and benefit NATO.
Kissinger was not the only one who was impressed that Ukraine managed to effectively repel Russian aggression, but his example is particularly worth our attention, for he was one of the most skillful geostrategic policymakers and one of the few prominent members of the American political establishment whose opinion matters to other policymakers around the world. Kissinger served as the national security advisor and later as the secretary of state under Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford. He provided his expertise on an ad hoc basis to another ten American leaders: John F. Kennedy, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and Joe Biden. He also offered his services to countless world leaders, Putin included. He was the only American to deal with every Chinese leader from Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping. It was unusual that Kissinger would announce that he had changed his mind about something of such global importance, and his expertise carries considerable weight (Campbell, 2023; Politico, 2016).
This chapter does not provide a holistic account of Kissinger’s life work, which will be left to biographers or future historians who will be able to approach this topic from the perspective of hindsight, whether evaluating the ethics of his actions or the consequences of his policies in conflict zones in a holistic manner, for Kissinger’s work and his expertise were used in conflict zones in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Balkans, and Eastern Europe. The discussion will lead us to a comprehensive evaluation of the initial peace proposal that Kissinger put forward in response to Zelensky’s idealistic blueprint, which aimed to project a more pragmatic vision of a possible end to the war in Ukraine in late 2022.
This proposal was dismissed by the Ukrainian government and other policymakers as old-school thinking, delusional, and at times even anti-Ukrainian or pro-Russian, but this did not discourage Kissinger from further persistent efforts to improve the situation in Ukraine.