The Problem
The rapid digitization of film and music and their distribution via the Internet is reflective of a changing business model. Hollywood’s delay in adapting to and securing this new medium has resulted in unauthorized alternative sources supplying digital music and movies. Advanced covert illegal distribution networks known as “Darknets” have emerged (Biddle, England, Peinado & Bryan, 2002; Lasica, 2003). Darknets mask malefactors’ identities and counter enforcement efforts by employing sophisticated technical measures within a closed hierarchical social structure resembling that of organized crime. In some instances, the lucrative operation of illegal file-sharing has drawn in traditional organized crime groups (Treverton, Matthies, Cunningham, Goulka, Ridgeway, & Wong, 2009).
The Motion Picture Association (MPA) estimated worldwide film industry losses from Internet piracy five years ago to be at $2.3 billion, with 80% of downloads originating from overseas (Siwek, 2006). On an annual basis, the recording industry estimates losses to be at $3.7 billion annually (Siwek, 2007). Rampant Peer-to-Peer (P2P)2 file-sharing has been blamed for the decline of the music industry (Rupp & Smith, 2004). While these figures are debatable (Cheng, 2009), they do suggest that illegal file-sharing is a large and expensive problem. Large losses are, in part, indicative of a security deficit from industry’s inadequacy to self-police.
To close the security gap, industry has collaborated with law enforcement in recent years. The Pirate Bay’s recent conviction in Sweden may be attributed, in part, to the creation of an FB- and MPAA-trained elite “P2P hit squad” consisting of Swedish police.3 Despite this recent success, law enforcement, in general, has been a reluctant partner in policing corporate victimization matters. This reluctance may result from a number of cultural and structural factors that prioritize street crimes. Historically, law enforcement has lacked the legal and jurisdictional flexibility to enforce complex crimes requiring inter-organizational relationships (Schlegel, 2000). Instead, it is a “slow-moving institution,” rooted in social norms (Rowland, 2004) and fortified by a strong subculture resistant to change (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). Nevertheless, high-tech crimes in the past few decades have forced police to change their orientation from strictly crime control to embracing new policing models based on information and risk management (Ericson & Haggerty, 1997).