Process Outcomes

Process Outcomes

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-5225-5118-8.ch004
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Based on the aforementioned, it is now possible to allow for a discussion on how mediation strategy can account for group congruence at the sub-group level and compatibility with the mediator's goals. A mediation strategy is the roadmap approach to the regulation of the conflict, including the principles of (1) process design (process); (2) roles, views, and expectations of local and international actors (context), coordination architecture; and (3) an indication of post-agreement requirements (outcome) to enable peace (agreement) implementation.
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Process Design

Mediation strategies have commonly been theorized and measured as three larger categories capturing the “method” of mediation, as per the terminology of Touval and Zartman (1985b). These mediation methods serve to illuminate the extent and expressions of power a mediator exerts on the parties. The framework of Touval and Zartman (1985b) differentiates between three categories of increasingly directive ways of mediating from (1) communication/facilitation, to (2) formulation, to (3) manipulation. According to Touval and Zartman (1985b), mediators relying on communication “serve as a telephone wire” between the parties, carrying and holding concessions, proposals or agreements in a relatively passive and straightforward manner. Mediators using formulation are more active and focused on redefining issues and finding formulas “from the pieces of the conflict itself” (Touval and Zartman 1985b: 12). This is done to identify a potential resolution, which is seen to be “hidden in the morass of bad relationships” (Touval and Zartman 1985b, 12). Finally, mediators using manipulation use their leverage—“resources of power, influence, and persuasion”—to more forcefully move the parties toward agreement. Such leverage may come from the parties’ need for help, the interests and positions of the parties vis-à-vis the mediator, or a stalemate. It may take the form of sticks (coerced costs), or carrots (induced benefits) (Touval and Zartman 1985b; Beardsley et al. 2006). Light mediation styles map on to the two less directive mediation strategies of facilitation and formulation. Heavy mediation style, in turn, uses leverage so that it “maximizes the cost of non-agreement”, changing the parties’ incentives through sanctions or inducements. This is done by, for example, offering security guarantees for the implementation of an agreement (Beardsley, 2011, 31). Heavy mediation style is equivalent to the third and most directive strategy category of manipulation. Other, multidimensional understandings of style have been introduced in case studies devoted to the investigation of certain individual mediators (Curran et al. 2004; Svensson and Wallensteen 2010). Mediation style has in this context been defined as “the [mediator’s] overall priorities in the process of mediation” (Svensson and Wallensteen 2010: xi). The understanding is multidimensional as the case studies differentiate between styles along the dimensions of, for example, the mediator’s overall role, party inclusivity, ways of relating to the parties and their audiences, and mediation goals/objectives (Curran et al. 2004; Svensson and Wallensteen 2010). Thus, while these latter definitions encourage broader understandings of style, most scholarly work on international mediation has focused on the mediating organizations’ coercive behavior in relation to producing a settlement (Bercovitch 1992: 16f; Bercovitch 2011: 27). Furthermore, most of these studies research the effects of mediation methods, strategies or styles, not their causes.

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