Security Issues of CPS

Security Issues of CPS

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-7312-0.ch008
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Abstract

As cyber physical system security is not satisfactory, the security of a particular infrastructure depends on both internal and other related vulnerabilities. Communications between components in the cyber and physical realms lead to unintentional information flow. This chapter describes the difficult communications that occurs between the cyber and physical domains and their impact on security. Assailants may be competent to initiate exclusive attacks to cyber physical systems. There are several types of attacks that affect the interactions between the cyber and physical devices, which might be in a passive way or in an active method. Even though the communication provides authenticity and confidentiality, a few attacks form some threats against ad hoc routing protocols as well as location-based security systems. It has been said that many attacks modify the activities of the targeted control system.
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Introduction

Since decades, the focus of vital foundations and modern control systems is Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), but then there have been definite instances of machine based attacks. CPS, in any case, is getting more helpless against machine assaults for some reasons. The basic discussion is about the requirement to build challenging models for CPS. At that point, it is recognized that a number of new and basically diverse issues being experienced in the case of CPS as contrasted to well-developed IT security. The depictions of the risks that may appear are required for a systematic investigation of the security of any system. Mounting a challenging model is an approach to comprehend the likelihood of the issue and evaluate the threats. The resources and the inspiration of some possible aggressors will be depicted now. Computers may be compromised anywhere by the cybercriminals and they can locate then even in control systems. These attacks may not be focused on. The goal of these attacks is not damaging control systems; however they may cause adverse reactions: the function of the control system which is infected with malware may be improper (Cardenas et al., 2009).

Today, the security of control systems is an active research field. Yet, from a research perspective, nobody would have expressed the novelty and the basic diversity of this field in contrast to traditional IT security. The product fixing and the property of not being suitable to rapid upgrades are the features distinguish the security of control systems from the traditional IT security. For instance, overhauling a system may need months to prepare the process of making the system offline. Consequently, it is financially hard to defend the suspension of the operation of an industrial computer all the time to establish new security patches. Some security patches may even abuse the official recognition of control systems (Cardenas et al, 2009).

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