Research on C2C E-Commerce Taxation Based on Mixed Decision Game

Research on C2C E-Commerce Taxation Based on Mixed Decision Game

Jiamian Yu, Haiyan Yu
Copyright: © 2022 |Pages: 14
DOI: 10.4018/JGIM.20220701.oa8
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Abstract

The rapid rise of C2C e-commerce in China has brought serious difficulties to China's tax collection and management. Based on the principle of progressive taxation, the necessity of Taxation on C2C e-commerce is analyzed and discussed. It is shown that the absence of Taxation in C2C e-commerce is contrary to the principle of tax equity and tax neutrality, and the tax revenue is lost.It is demonstrated that it is imperative that China to implement C2C e-commerce taxation in a comprehensive and standardized way. By constructing a hybrid decision game model between C2C business operators and tax authorities, the static game analysis of incomplete information is conducted for the balance of interests between tax authorities and e-commerce operators.
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Introduction

In recent years, e-commerce has developed rapidly in China, and its business scale and transaction volume have increased significantly, and a mature business model has been formed. According to AI statistics, in 2016, the scale of China's e-commerce market exceeded 20 trillion yuan for the first time, ranking first in the world, and will maintain steady and rapid growth in the next few years (Biswas, 2018). E-commerce has gradually changed people's trading concepts and greatly affected our consumption patterns.

The impact of e-commerce on traditional taxation and the loss of tax revenue is also increasing. Therefore, whether to cope with e-commerce taxation and how to levy taxes has become the focus of attention in the social and academic circles.

The mainstream e-commerce is mainly divided into three categories: B2B (enterprise to enterprise), B2C (enterprise to consumer) and C2C (consumer to consumer). B2B and B2C rely on entity registration companies online, that is, a positive tax entity. The two types of e-commerce, B2C and B2B, can be taxed in accordance with the traditional offline entity transaction methods, while China’s B2C and B2B have combined traditional invoices and electronic invoices to pay taxes. B2C suppliers such as JD.com, Yihaodian and Tmall are paying taxes. Therefore, the tax collection and management of the above two categories of e-commerce are indisputable. Compared with the above two models, C2C tax entities are difficult to materialize, and the transaction location is online. C2C accounts for a relatively large proportion of China's e-commerce transactions, having exceeded 50% before 2014 and accounted for 48.1% in 2015. The tax gap of C2C e-commerce has brought a lot of tax losses to our country, which has seriously affected the principles of tax equity and tax neutrality.

In this context, it is particularly necessary to study the taxation issues of C2C e-commerce. The research will help strengthen the market supervision of e-commerce and promote the improvement of the tax system. It is feasible and effective to analyze the necessity and main line of tax collection and management of C2C e-commerce through tax principle theory and game analysis. The suggestions made based on the analysis results also have good reference significance.

The innovation of this research is reflected in three aspects: research perspective, research content and research design. From the perspective of research, the article chooses C2C business operators as the starting point and the tax authorities as participants in game analysis. This research method broadens the existing research ideas in the field of e-commerce, and opens up new ideas for the optimization of e-commerce taxation practices. The tax issue of C2C e-commerce selected in this paper is not only the bottleneck of the development of the e-commerce industry, but also the focus of e-commerce research, and further enriches the research results of C2C e-commerce taxation. From the two aspects of the necessity of C2C e-commerce taxation and the C2C game analysis of the hybrid decision of e-commerce taxation, the qualitative and quantitative analysis is carried out respectively. Full consideration of the interest relationship of C2C e-commerce sales entities is an effective practice of monetary theory and taxation theory, and the result is more reliable, rigorous and scientific.(llies,2006;Judge,2002;Judge,1998;Judge,2013;23.Fabisiak,2018;Shahri,2019;Peng,2019; Pham,2019)

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