Abstract
The chapter investigates an interesting twist in the bilateral relations between Ukraine and Poland under the Morawiecki Government. It discusses the main reasons that led Morawiecki to drastically change from a very generous response to Russia's invasion to an openly hostile stance after Zelensky's UN Speech. The chapter explores the rationale that led Morawiecki to impose an embargo on Ukrainian grain and other agricultural commodities during the summer of 2023. It deliberates on the post-2023 improvement of these relations after the formation of the Tusk government. It exemplifies that even if certain disagreements over the scale of the offered assistance arise in the countries that eagerly helped Ukraine since February 2022, those disagreements can be appropriately dealt with. The ferocity of Putin's war against Ukraine failed to discourage Ukraine's most loyal friends from stepping up their support. Paradoxically for Putin, despite all his efforts to turn such a scenario into an undesirable one, Ukraine today is much closer to becoming a full EU and NATO member than ever.
“Geography has made us neighbors. History has made us friends. Economics has made us partners, and necessity has made us allies. Those whom God has so joined together, let no man put asunder.” — John F. Kennedy
May 17, 1961, in an address before the Canadian parliament, on the Canada-US relationship.
TopIntroduction
The chapter aims to enhance the ongoing discourse regarding Poland's response to Russia's war in Ukraine by clarifying a specific case that necessitates a more rigorous evaluation, untainted by typical media sensationalism, exaggeration, and unfounded conclusions.
While the chronology of NATO's and the EU's responses to this conflict is well covered by both the media and various valuable academic accounts, Poland’s response to the latest outbreak of Russia’s neo-imperialist war in Ukraine is still relatively undercovered and insufficiently integrated into the literature describing the global response to this conflict. Without delving into Poland’s role in Ukraine’s defense strategy, we miss the broader picture, as the internal dynamics of Poland’s response to various stages of this conflict have had a considerable impact on the way the war has evolved into a regional conflict of global importance.
Three main stages of this response have been identified: the first started on February 24, 2022, and lasted for at least 18 months until Zelensky's UN Speech in September 2023, which triggered a considerable change in Poland’s attitudes towards Ukraine. Subsequently, this short period of open hostility between both governments ended on December 13, 2023, when the Tusk replaced Morawiecki at the head of Poland's government and adopted a more pragmatic response towards Ukraine (which will be covered in a separate chapter in a forthcoming book published by IGI Global (Pietrzak, 2024b)).
In February 2022, Poland demonstrated unwavering Giedroycian commitment to the Ukrainian authorities and people, which extended to providing arms for their defense, safe havens for millions of Ukrainian refugees, and logistical, material, and financial support for the embattled regime. The swift and determined response from Poland in those early days of the conflict was considered relatively risky at the time, yet it set off a significant momentum that spurred an even more generous global response to support Ukraine during that challenging period. This generous assistance from Poland played a crucial role in boosting and maintaining Ukrainian morale, which assisted Ukraine in securing its survival as an independent state. Poland's proactive humanitarian response during this conflict set a standard that provided other parties with a stronger rationale to offer even more generous logistical, military, political, and diplomatic assistance to Ukraine (Pietrzak, 2024a).
While there is no way to discuss all the determinants that shaped the current situation in the Ukrainian war, we can recognize that there was a considerable change in Morawiecki's attitudes towards Ukraine in the last six months of his government. His positions drifted from one of Poland’s total and unwavering support in 2022 to one of considerably less enthusiasm after the UN Speech in which Zelensky insinuated that Poland was secretly supporting Russia because of its embargo on Ukrainian agricultural commodities and its categorical refusal to incur the costs of Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative (Kokcharov et al., 2023).
During this time, the idea of protecting Ukraine at all costs was secondary due to a series of undesirable economic effects on two important sectors of the Polish economy, farming and transport. The government could not afford to offset the costs of both of those sectors while it suffered a harsh EU sanctions regime that penalized the government for a ruling by its highest court that some parts of EU law are incompatible with the Polish constitution. After pressure from Ukraine, the EU attempted to force the Polish government to lift the embargo, but Poland refused to comply, explaining that lifting the embargo would not result in Ukranian products reaching its traditional destinations in the developing world, but rather they would oversaturate the Central European market (Ilie & Strzelecki, 2023).
Key Terms in this Chapter
The Mearsheimer Doctrine: This suggests for NATO a far-reaching restraint as far as Ukraine is concerned to avoid any escalations, for, in the end, the Ukraine war of 2022 and the previous annexation of Crimea in 2014 happened because of Western promises made to this country (Source: Pietrzak 2024a /b/c/d/e/f).
The Revised Kissinger Doctrine: This, announced at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2023, pragmatically suggests that a neutral Ukraine is no longer meaningful or viable; therefore, the only way to end the war in Ukraine is to offer it full NATO membership (Source: Pietrzak, 2024a /b/c/d/e/f).
Davutoglu’s “Zero Problems with Neighbors”: A robust articulation of the geostrategic policies described in Ahmet Davutoglu's Strategic Depth , in which he advocates amiable relations with all of Turkey’s neighbors, but his tenure as the country’s foreign policy minister saw a number of failures in implementing these policies primarily due to the adoption of the Erdogan’s hawkish policy of neo-Ottomanism and the religions indoctrination of Turkish society.
The Jaishankar Doctrine: This suggests that under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India is able to reclaim its rightful place among today's global leaders. Jaishankar advocates collaboration with the West, Russia, and China on an equal basis and without following Western advice to downgrade Indian-Russian relations (Source: Pietrzak, 2024c).
The Giedroyc-Mieroszewski Doctrine: Highlights the structural importance of an independent Ukraine, explicitly suggesting that, from the Polish and Central European perspective, an independent Ukraine is crucial to realizing the dream of an independent and peaceful Europe. As an independent country, Ukraine's borders should be protected (Source: Pietrzak, 2024a /b/c/d/e/f).
The Skubiszewski Doctrine of Zero Problems with Neighbors: This stands as a strategic blueprint crafted by Krzysztof Skubiszewski, the first foreign policy minister of the Third Republic of Poland. He not only envisioned but successfully realized a geostrategic framework for ensuring a secure neighborhood. Skubiszewski's proactive approach involved active dialogue with all seven neighbors of Poland since 1989. His enduring achievements were fortified by a determined push for the renewal of mutually and bilaterally recognized treaties, solidifying Poland's status as a regional leader in peacemaking initiatives. During his tenure, Poland earned the distinction of being the first country to recognize several post-Soviet republics, including Ukraine. Despite evolving into the policy of No Problems with International Actors who Respect the Rule of International Law and Territorial Integrity after 2008, 2014, 2015, and 2022, Skubiszewski's doctrine retained its core principles. Successors such as Geremek, Bartoszewski, and Sikorski diligently continued this vital project. However, given recent challenges and the rapid deterioration of regional stability, it is crucial to reaffirm and uphold the principles of the Skubiszewski Doctrine to safeguard Poland's interests and regional peace.
The Brzezinski Doctrine: This recommends avoiding direct involvement in an open-ended conflict with Russia on behalf of Ukraine. Instead, it advocates more comprehensive support for Ukraine and other countries in the so-called Rimland, the region surrounding the Heartland (Russia and China). In this context, Brzezinski's work proposes expediting covert efforts across various domains—military, political, logistical, diplomatic, humanitarian, and material—against enemies. All these efforts are aimed at supporting these countries on their transatlantic route because only such an outcome can truly bring peace and stability to Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the rest of the world (Inspired by: Pietrzak, 2023b ).
The Bartoszewski Doctrine: This suggests that “Europe means above all else freedom of the individual and human rights” and suggests that Polish geostrategy above all project decency in the realm of foreign policy, for “it's worth being decent” (Inspired by: Pochron, 2022 ).