Our theories of communication have assumed that we deliberate before we express our thoughts; this chapter points out that we implicitly and explicitly hold a rationalist view of thinking and behavior. Instead, social intuition theory proposes that intuition plays a major role in how and what we communicate. This chapter develops the argument for social intuition theory and discusses a range of empirical evidence supporting the theory. It lays out some important ways in which social intuition theory applies to communication theory, for instance, in its explanation of the place and function of giving reasons. It raises questions for communication theory that have gone unattended, and it supplies answers. It discusses how our ideologies take part in our everyday communication behaviors while remaining outside of consciousness. It questions the absence of intuition in textbooks on communication theory.
TopGiving And Seeking Reasons
The thesis of this book is that recognizing the ways in which deliberate thinking and intuitive thinking take part in our lives challenges our theories of human communication and serves to clarify a great range of ordinary behavior. This chapter develops the argument for social intuition theory and discusses a range of empirical evidence supporting the theory. The chapters that follow report on how social intuition theory contributes to our understanding of human communication. Some of the chapters will show just how deliberate and intuitive thinking enter into specific areas of our lives. Research shows that our beliefs and our values play a critical role in our thinking. Let’s begin with how we support our behavior, how we support our beliefs, our values, and our assertions as we communicate.
To be asked “Why did you do that or why did you say that?” presupposes you typically act with reasons and that if asked, you are able to express those reasons. You might deny that you did (said) that. Failing that denial, when you offer reasons to answer the question, it is assumed the reasons given report on what led to the action. The reasons offered are intended to explain why you performed the action. You might respond abstractly—“I did my best,” which doesn’t really explain why you did that, or you might respond in terms of cause, “I was forced to do it,” or in terms of what you were attempting to achieve by doing it, or from an ethical perspective, “It was the right thing to do,” and maybe additional kinds of reasons. The reasons offered assumedly signal what beliefs you held prior to performing the action. The reasons offered imply a connection between your beliefs and the action you performed. The reasons offered are up for judgment (Nofsinger, 1975; Nofsinger, 1991). Now we get to judge. It is assumed that the reasons you give represent what you believe to be true (Grice, 1975). Do the reasons offered explain the action? Do they justify the action? Do the reasons place you in control of the action and therefore responsible for the action? Are they logically connected to the action? Are they good reasons or not? Can we identify with those reasons? To answer, “I don’t know why I did (said) that,” suggests a lack of control, a less than optimal way of acting, an action motivated by emotion, impulse, and possibly “thoughtlessness,” a problem with your memory, or possibly a refusal to answer honestly. Looking at this question another way, instead of asking you “Why did you do (say) that?” we might decide on our own why we think you did (said) that. Or your foreseeing that we might wonder “why you did (said) that,” you might communicate reasons “why,” either directly or indirectly, without being asked. And of course, there are other ways to ask, ‘why did you do (say) that?” For instance, “I’m confused by what happened, can you please explain it?” “Help me understand what you meant.” In the end, we get to judge; you get to give reasons. If pressed to explain further, for instance, “why was that the right thing to do,” could you readily explain? And did you consciously know why that was the right thing to do before you did it? Perhaps we act on impulse and often are not aware of why we say and do things or even why we believe things. A considerable amount of folk psychology--also called implicit theory--describes the underlying rules and metaphysical assumptions of such communication events, made up of a theory of mind and a rationalist model of thought and action. What is meant by metaphysical assumptions is the idea that other people have minds and in their minds they have beliefs, motives, intentions and other intangibles. What is meant by the rationalist model is the idea that people reason their way from those intangibles to what they communicate and that the receiver reasons their way to understanding what lies behind the observed action.
Even a cursory examination of our everyday communication lives reveals that giving reasons and seeking reasons makes up a large part of what we communicate to ourselves and to one another. Tracy (2002) refers to reason giving as accounting (p. 77), what she more generally refers to as a rhetorical perspective on communicating (p.191). It is difficult to imagine a dialogue in which reasons do not play a role? Reasons are built into how we think; reasons are integral to categorizing and meaning-making (Lakoff, 1987). Reasons are built into the very categories we use to organize our perceptions.