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Top1. Introduction
For decades, the company’s capital structure choice has remained a primordial subject he was passionate about the world of finance and gave birth too many theories and studies. The academic reflection relating to the choice and the determinants of the financial structure of historically knows three major approaches. First, the classic approach is based on the accounting concept of financial leverage. It affirms the neutrality of companies' profitability. In this context, debt has both an increasing advantage for the shareholder (positive leverage) and an increasing disadvantage for the shareholder (Roy, 1952; Tobin, 1958; Gordon, 1959 ; Roberts, 1959…). Second, the neoclassical approach, the debate on the structure of capital is started by Modigliani and Miller (1958). They theoretically analyzed the impact of the financial structure and more particularly the debt ratio (debts / equity) on the value of the firm. In fact, they demonstrated the independence between financial structure and cost of capital in a perfect world. In (1963) Modigliani and Miller corrected their first model and take into account corporate tax, in particular the deductibility of financial interest on taxable income. They demonstrate that the value of the indebted enterprise is greater than that of the non-indebted enterprise. The additional value of is equal to the discounted sum of the tax savings due to the deductibility of interest charges on the debt. Therefore the neoclassical objective of maximizing the value of the company leads it to go into debt as much as possible. Miller (1977) has taken up the work of Modigliani and Miller (1958 and 1963). He adds a new concept consists of the introduction of personal tax. The researcher's objective is to find justifications preventing companies from going into debt. They found that personal tax divergence limits the level of debt of firms. Finally, the third approach, known as the “modern theory of the firm”, this theory intervening in the mid-70s after the work of Modigliani and Miller. The objective of this theory is to explain and define the financing structure through the introduction of financial variables. These are the costs of financial distress (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973), the existence of agency costs and also the existence of information asymmetry (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In fact, the gradual introduction of market imperfections has led to the birth of new theories. These theories have contributed to the understanding of corporate obsessed financial structures. We’re talking about static Trade off Theory, pecking order Theory, agency costs, the signal or market-timing.
However, despite the contributions of these approaches to the analysis of corporate financial policy, several decisions remain unclear. Indeed, if we accept, for example, the Trade-off, the financing structures observed can be: without costs of adjustment of the structure and with optimal ratios or goods with costs of adjustments and the ratios approach the optimum (Azouzi, 2019). We see a divergence between the theories explanatory (organizational financial theory) of the company's financial policy and the choices made by the leaders in reality. It appears that financial theory adopts a normative framework with the aim of maximizing the utility function of the actors which poorly translates the reality. It therefore ignores the central role of the decision maker in detecting opportunities for profit shareholders assumed to be the only actors to bear the risk as a last resort. Without doubt, neglecting the active role of leaders explains at least partially this distance from the practices of theory.
Several contemporary researchers have tried to find new explanations for the financing structures of companies. Norden and Kampen, (2013) consider that guarantees make it possible to cover both long and short-term debt. In this context, the political relations of a company can be seen as a guarantee for the banks, especially when the majority shareholder or the company manager is a minister or a member of parliament, therefore access to debt becomes easier than other companies (Hamrouni and al, 2020; khwa and al, 2019;Chkir and al,2020; Tan and al, 2020….). Other researchers argue that companies with a high level of Social Responsibility benefit from getting into debt easily (Andres, et al, 2005 ; Peter, et al, 2005; Attig et al, 2013; Cheng et al, 2014). They develop close relationships with stakeholders in order to support their activities in times of crisis.