A primary causal mechanism cited for biased information processing and poor credibility assessment is the reliance on heuristic social information processing—a nonanalytic orientation in which only a minimal set of informational cues are considered as long as processing accuracy is deemed sufficient. As defined by Chaiken’s Heuristic-Systematic Model of information processing (HSM; Chaiken, 1980; Todorov, Chaiken, & Henderson, 2002), heuristics are mental shortcuts, or simple decision rules, arising from conventional beliefs and expectations used repeatedly in daily interactions. In contrast to heuristic processing, systematic information processing requires more careful consideration of all available evidence, and is thus much more cognitively taxing (Chen & Chaiken, 1999).
The HSM posits that reliance on heuristics is often preferable because it minimizes cognitive effort while satisfying motivational concerns with sufficient reliability. Heuristics often provide swift solutions to complex, ill-structured problems (Silverman, 1992; Van Boven & Loewenstein, 2005), however, reliance on heuristics can also lead to insufficient consideration and/or disregard of relevant, diagnostic information. Consequently, although heuristics do not always lead to bias, an overreliance on them can result in decreased soundness of credibility assessments. According to the HSM, motivation, time, and ability to process information are critical elements for reducing analytical reliance on heuristic processing, and encouraging more optimal systematic, deliberative processing.